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No. 4, April 1983

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USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 4, April 1983

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REAGAN ANTI-SOVIET POLICY CALLED 'CONSPIRACY AGAINST WHOLE WORLD'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 83 (signed to press 18 Mar 83) pp 3-6

[Article by N. D. Turkatenko: "A Conspiracy Against the Entire World"]

[Text] So many political "tigers" and "hawks," militant political scientists and ideologists have wanted to establish a "Pax Americana" in the entire sub-lunary world.... History seems to have taught enough convincing lessons: All the plans for impudent interference in other countries' affairs, even when these were supported by the entire economic, military and political might of the American state, inevitably fell through.

The Soviet press has already called to mind that even in 1948--that is, only 3 years after the defeat of Hitlerist fascism by the allied forces, a defeat to which the Soviet Union had made a decisive contribution, the U.S. National Security Council elaborated the NSC-7 memorandum which defined the main U.S. task for all the foreseeable future as "defeating the forces of world communism led by the Soviets." The authors of this memorandum declared: "The United States must assume the leading role in organizing a universal counter-offensive with the aim of mobilizing our own forces and the anticommunist forces of the non-Soviet world as well as undermining the might of the communist forces."

If any of the authors of the NSC-7 memorandum are still alive, they can now see for themselves that the Soviet Union is alive and prospering and the achievements of real socialism and the ideas of scientific communism have won the hearts and minds of millions upon millions of people. Open to all that is best and advanced in modern science and culture, Marxism-Leninism is in the vanguard of the intellectual life of the world. This is the philosophy of social optimism, the philosophy of the present and the future. It is not capitalism, let alone the most frantic imperialist circles, that is now determining the main path of world development. This path is being determined by the countries of the socialist community that are armed with Marxist-Leninist philosophy, by the international workers and communist movement and by the popular liberation struggle. These are the "locomotives of history" which guide mankind along the path leading to a world without wars, exploitation and diktat in the sphere of international relations.

The most aggressive U.S. groupings, with whose support the present Republican administration came to power, intend to turn back the course of events. Washington is developing another anticommunist "crusade" with the aim of leading the "universal offensive" of anticommunism headed by the United States, just as the authors of NSC-7 planned. Let us recall that this "crusade" was announced in the speech delivered by the U.S. President to the British Parliament in June 1982. The current Washington figures have made quite a few speeches in this vein. However, their activity is not limited to speeches alone, just as the intentions of the initiators of the declared "crusade"--although it is, first and foremost, of an anti-Soviet nature--are not limited to the sphere of the United States' relations with the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. These intentions are of a global character--neither more, nor less. Latter-day "crusaders" are not only pushing the United States to exacerbate further its confrontation with the Soviet Union. They also strive to torpedo once and for all any attempts at continuing the process of detente, be it in Europe, Asia, Latin America or Africa, and to foist on the countries of all continents a system which is convenient for imperialism and the unending new spirals of the arms race, bringing the world close to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. At the same time--by ostensibly manifesting an alleged concern for the "values of civilization and democracy" and for the "vital interests of the United States"--they are trying to justify to the people of their own country their course of gross interference in the affairs of others and their policy of acting from a position of strength.

The Political Declaration of the January (1983) Prague conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries points out: "The lessons of history teach us that anticommunism has always been a component part of the offensive against democratic freedoms and the rights of peoples and of the policy of aggression and war. The attempts to organize a new anti-communist crusade will lead to a buildup of international tension which will threaten the interests of all countries." Let us emphasize: all countries, including the United States.

More and more tens and hundreds of millions of dollars (apart from the billions spent on the arms race) are allocated to implement the intentions of the initiators of the "crusade," the most up-to-date technology and armies of politologists and mass communications specialists are sent into the fray. The coordination of all this activity is brought up to the highest executive level. In line with Presidential Directive No 77, a special committee on the cabinet level, including the CIA leadership and headed by the President's national security adviser, has been formed for this purpose in Washington.

First in line in the priorities of the "crusade" is the provision of financial and other means for a broadly developed and long-term propaganda campaign which, on the pretext of the "need to improve the understanding of Washington's policy among all countries and peoples," is confined to activating attempts to discredit the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and intensifying the psychological war against them as well as against the developing countries which reject the American-style democracy, and against the national liberation movements. The essence and direction of this campaign are clearly discernible in the document "Presidential Program for

Democracy and Public Diplomacy," published by the State Department, and in the work of the "International Conference" on "New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy," which was jointly held in Washington in February by the U.S. Information Agency and the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University (one of the "think tanks" closest to the administration whose elaborations are called upon to "provide a scientific basis," so to speak, for Washington's foreign policy course).

Which democracy and which "new" directions of U.S. foreign policy do they have in mind? Both the program and the materials of the conference give quite a definite answer to this question. Under the guise of expanding democracy, Washington intends to continue resorting to acts of sabotage and diversion, give "assistance," including financial assistance, to "free trade unions," press organs and political parties in other countries, to give leading positions in foreign countries to people who have had the necessary training in the United States and so forth. In short, if there is anything "new" here, it is the--more open than usual--confirmation of Washington's hegemonistic ambitions and its intention to use all possible ways and means to interfere in the affairs of others.

The declared program and the conference are only a component part of a series of measures which are designed to support, ideologically and organizationally, the aggressive foreign policy line, the line toward upsetting the existing strategic parity and securing military superiority for the United States and NATO over the Warsaw Pact countries, the line of wrecking the Geneva negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons and the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe in order first of all to "push through" the plans of deploying the new U.S. missiles there already this year.

Somewhat earlier, in October 1982, again in Washington, there was a conference "On the Problems of Democratization in Communist Countries," organized by the State Department within the framework of the "crusade" and the campaign of brainwashing public opinion in the United States and other countries where there is growing resistance to this line. Accompanied by profuse talk about the "growing Soviet threat," the participants in the conference discussed measures aimed at undermining the socialist system in the USSR and other socialist countries, thus blatantly violating the principle of noninterference in each other's affairs, established in a number of Soviet-U.S. agreements. Hardly had the ink dried, as the saying goes, on the plans drawn up by the participants when the State Department convoked an "International Conference on Free Elections" in November with the participation of a whole crowd of U.S. and foreign specialists in the sphere of foreign political propaganda and "Sovietologists." The work of this conference was directed at elaborating the most up-to-date methods of exporting bourgeois ideology to the socialist countries and the young states which have chosen the independent way of development, and this orientation was given to it in the speeches of the U.S. President and vice-president and the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations.

The most reactionary regimes with which Washington has close relations are being actively involved in the "crusade" (which, let us recall, was declared,

among other things, "in support of democracy"). According to U.S. press reports, the administration has entrusted the U.S. Information Agency with the task of organizing (at the expense of the U.S. taxpayers, of course) regular seminars with the representatives of these regimes "as a means of teaching the methods of propaganda work" and giving the public a "favorable impression" of these friends of the United States. The leadership in this "difficult task" is entrusted, according to the WASHINGTON POST, to a certain A. MacKenzie who was formerly the official consultant and press liaison of former Nicaraguan Dictator Somoza and who, as the newspaper sarcastically remarked, "never succeeded in solving the problems connected with his own poor public image." Now the abovementioned specialist has undertaken an equally hopeless job because the participants of the seminars include representatives of the Salvadoran, Chilean and Guatemalan juntas and envoys of the Haitian dictator.

As we can see, Washington has developed truly feverish activity as regards interference in the affairs of others and the exacerbation of world tension. According to the plans of its initiators, this policy should act in many directions. In particular, it is also calculated to intimidate the population of their own country and make it reconcile itself to the worsening conditions of life, such as unemployment, inflation and reduced social spending accompanied by unrestrained expenditures on the arms race, which undermines the economy and whose further increase is demanded ever more insistently and successfully by the military-industrial complex. Thus, the intention is to break down the wave of social unrest in the country and, what is most important, to take the wind out of the sails of the participants in the mass antimilitarist and antimissile movement who demand a freeze on nuclear arsenals. As can be seen, for example, from the recent statements by participants such as H. Bethe, physicist and Nobel Prize winner (by the way, he is one of the "fathers" of the nuclear bomb) and C. Gottfried, leader of the Union of Concerned Scientists, they understand more and more clearly that the Washington administration is "rushing headlong into catastrophe."

In a WASHINGTON POST article, these scientists wrote: "The attitude of the Reagan Administration toward nuclear weapons and nuclear war causes great concern among Americans. The wave of public support for the idea of a nuclear freeze provides a sufficiently loud and clear signal. It says: Stop the arms race. We want to be rid of it! Besides, the country is seriously worried that little can be done in this respect at a time when the administration in power displays as little flexibility as the present one." The authors call upon the U.S. Congress to change--by way of legal measures, the appropriate resolutions and hearings--the political situation in which the shaping of government policy takes place. While unmasking the doctrine of "limited" nuclear war and the use of the threat to employ nuclear arms in order to achieve certain aims in the international arena, these scientists emphasize: "The use of nuclear arms to achieve whatever military or political aims is fraught with unacceptable risks."

The fact that Washington cultivates a symbiosis of psychological warfare in its most shameless forms with a militarist course is hard to classify as anything but a conspiracy against the whole world.

This policy is opposed by the powerful peaceful offensive of the Soviet Union and all the countries of the socialist community, which put forth new concrete initiatives at the end of 1982 and the beginning of 1983 on the sharp reduction of nuclear and conventional arms in line with the principle of the equality and equivalent security of both sides and for the elaboration of confidence-building measures between states as well as the development of comprehensive international cooperation.

Yu. V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasizes: "We are in favor of broad and fruitful cooperation free from diktat and interference in the affairs of others among all the peoples of the planet to their mutual advantage and for the benefit of all mankind. The Soviet Union will do everything within its power to guarantee a secure and peaceful future for present and coming generations. This is the aim of our policy and we will not retreat from it."

The consistent Leninist foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet State raises hope and assurance in the hearts of all to whom the fate of our planet is dear. This policy also meets with growing understanding among the sober-minded Americans who persistently strive to have Washington reject the course of confrontation and revival of the "cold war" and who insist on the quickest possible return of Soviet-American relations to the path of constructive cooperation in the name of peace on earth.

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REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TRIES TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES IN SCIENCE R & D

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 83 (signed to press 18 Mar 83) pp 7-17

[Article by A. A. Dynkin: "The Search for a Scientific and Technical Strategy for the 1980's in the United States"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The arrival of the Republican administration in 1980 made significant changes in U.S. science policy. The Reagan Administration's decisions in this area indicate two fundamental approaches. First of all, funds for military research began to rise at an unprecedented rate (a rise of 21.4 percent in 1981-1982); there was also a rise in funds for some space R & D programs (almost 5 percent during the same period), particularly those connected with the militarization of space. Secondly, the administration feels that private investments should become the main source of funds for R & D in the civilian sector as a result of the new system of corporate tax deductions and depreciation credits.

Total U.S. investments in R & D at the beginning of the 1980's exceeded 80 billion dollars a year.¹ The attempts of previous administrations to work out a longer-range science policy are being continued and even intensified in order to determine the prime objectives (or priorities) of American scientific and technical development.

Reasons for the New Approach

The intensification of efforts to work out a scientific and technical strategy is connected with an entire group of factors, among which the following are the most prominent.

The decline of virtually all indicators of production efficiency and scientific and technical progress in the American economy in the 1970's evoked particular concern in the United States. This applied above all to the comprehensive indicator of labor productivity. Its growth rate between 1971 and 1980 fell to almost half the rate for the previous decade. This decline was unprecedented both in terms of depth and in terms of duration in all the time the indicator has been calculated as part of official statistics.

... that "technological gap" in a number of key areas between the United States and Japan and between the United States and the leading West European countries was sharply reduced in the 1970's, and in some cases it was even eliminated. The reason was the poor functioning of the entire mechanism for the creation and incorporation of innovations in the American economy in comparison to the preceding period and in comparison to the country's closest rivals.

As a result of the poor functioning of the mechanism for the incorporation of innovations, the United States is no longer the undisputed technological leader in such branches as the automotive industry, household electronics, the scientific equipment, steel and shipbuilding industries and railway transport. This has been accompanied by the reduction of the competitive potential of American products, including those with a high scientific input. The U.S. share of world exports of the latter type of product dropped from 31 percent in 1962 to 21 percent in 1979.²

At present, scientific and technical problems are growing more difficult, some of them are acquiring global dimensions and their resolution requires a comprehensive approach. In the 1940's and 1950's the development of science and technology in the United States was of a sectorial nature, and in the 1960's and 1970's it was primarily aimed at specific goals: the landing of a manned space vehicle on the moon and the creation of other large technical systems with previously specified technical and economic parameters by a specific date. In the 1980's the resolution of the majority of problems--for example, the augmentation of labor productivity, the improvement of the quality of housing and education and the development of communication and transportation systems--requires a systemic approach or, in other words, long-term and coordinated efforts on the part of all elements of national scientific and technical potential. Major achievements today are often connected with an entire group of related technical innovations, and not with a single discovery.

The interval between the time when decisions are made on matters of scientific policy and the time of their implementation is growing longer, and this is heightening the risk of these decisions. The current state of scientific and technical progress is distinguished by the increased uncertainty of the fundamental changes that will come about within the near future as a result of the use of major achievement in biology, microelectronics, power engineering and other scientific and technical fields. In connection with this, the significance of "technology assessment" from the standpoint of the comprehensive consideration of all possible consequences of its development has increased for objective reasons.

Finally, science in the United States is now regarded as an extremely important instrument in the attempts to change the military-strategic balance in the world in Washington's favor. The hope of augmenting the arsenal of power tactics in the international arena is associated with a stronger role for "technological diplomacy."

On the whole, the need for a long-range scientific and technical strategy is being dictated by the desire to strengthen the position of capitalism in

general and U.S. monopolistic capital in particular. The heightened interest in a long-range scientific policy and in a precise system of priorities in scientific and technical development is attested to by the forecasts that are regularly compiled on the governmental level with regard to science and technology in accordance with a 1976 law on national scientific and technical policy. The forecasts are compiled every other year and have a sliding 5-year forecasting schedule. To date, the National Science Foundation (NSF) has compiled two 5-year outlooks on science and technology with the aid of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of Science and several other organizations under the general supervision of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The main purpose of the forecasts is to determine and describe the status and conditions of scientific and technical development that will require special attention in the next 5 years.³

Proceeding from this extremely limited definition of the chief aim, the two forecasts published by the NSF certainly do not represent national plans or even estimates of desired development indicators, but an attempt to collate "under one cover" the maximum quantity of information required for decision making in the field of science and technology.⁴

Problems in the Organization and Management of Scientific Research

In the general context, the main assumption in the forecasts is that the continuation and acceleration of scientific and technical progress will be "an essential condition in excluding the possibility of social, economic and ecological regression in the future." As KOMMUNIST magazine noted, capitalism has an interest in the maximum development of science and technology by virtue of its unrestrained race for profits, and it has already accumulated a century of experience in the use of science and technology for the resolution or alleviation of crises.⁵

The NSF experts proceed from the belief that the development of the U.S. scientific base will encounter specific problems within the next 5 years: the scarcity of resources; the negative demographic factor complicating the training of new scientific personnel; the rising cost of scientific equipment and instruments; the stronger incentives for the quickest possible recoupment of R & D investments and the consequent reduction in the number of long-term research projects.

The authors of the forecasts believe that national efforts should be directed within the near future toward improvements in the process by which innovations are created and incorporated, the reduction of the time gap between research and the use of research findings, the enhancement of efficiency in the final stages of the creation of innovations.

An important place has been assigned to the financing of fundamental science, whose development is considered to be a national objective. A mechanism is to be worked out to determine the possibilities for the practical use of fundamental scientific achievements as soon as they appear.

The forecasters predict that private industry's ability to invest in research will remain limited within the next few years, allegedly due to the scarcity

at corporate financial resources, but they express the hope that private investments will be expanded as a result of the overall improvement of economic conditions and that research activity will be stimulated by structural changes in industry.

The pride of American science, the universities, will probably encounter two main problems in the next 5 years: the demographic problem and the aging of the fixed assets of university laboratories.

The number of people between the ages of 18 and 24 in the United States will continue to decrease right up to 1990. This will heighten the competition between universities and colleges for applicants, but it will not eradicate the tension in the skilled manpower market in the future, particularly in the case of computer experts and engineers, because demand will exceed supply. The reduction in the number of students will automatically reduce university budgets and the number of teaching personnel, who also account for most of the analytical research. Besides this, the tendency of highly skilled specialists to move from universities to industry, to which they are attracted by higher pay and the superior laboratory base of corporations, will remain an acute problem in the near future. Difficulties in the timely modernization of the active portion of university fixed capital are connected with the rise in the cost of scientific instruments and equipment in the 1970's--exceeding the rate of inflation by 4 percent--and the reduction of state funds for university research.

The recommended methods of correcting imbalances include the allocation of special funds for universities for the purchase of scientific instruments, the augmentation of the flexibility of government contracts by combining the funds allocated for various projects and for equipment purchases, the development of regional centers for the rental of scientific equipment and the provision of universities with broader access to the centralized fixed assets of government research organizations.

The chief drawback of scientific research in the private sector of the American economy is its short-term nature. The ineffective methods of governmental regulation and deteriorating economic conditions in the 1970's, which lowered the profit margin and raised the rate of inflation, heightened the instability of business activity and made the competition between American firms and their foreign rivals keener. This lowered profitability and heightened the risk of long-term R & D investments and led to the redistribution of expenditures in favor of the improvement of existing products, technology and services with a stronger position in the market and, consequently, to the detriment of the creation of fundamental innovations.⁶ The authors of the forecast regard this radical change in corporate scientific and technical policy in the 1970's as the main reason for the poor functioning of the entire mechanism for the creation and incorporation of innovations, the longer interval between the scientific discovery and its incorporation and the lower growth rate of labor productivity.

In connection with these difficulties, the forecast sets two related national goals: higher total investments in industrial research and a larger share of funds for long-term projects.

Despite the forecasters' repeated and valid statements about the inadequacy of government measures in relation to today's scientific and technical objectives, the attainment of these objectives is still being projected largely on the basis of these measures. "Although few would suggest the total cancellation of regulation in industry, there is a general consensus that government policy could and should be more effective and selective and should help to reduce the cost of complying with rigid government standards and stimulate long-term R & D investments."

Within the framework of this concept, the forecasters believe that government's main objective in the sphere of scientific and technical progress should be the creation of favorable prospects for economic development. They also believe the government should sustain the scientific and educational potential of American universities, the main centers of fundamental research, with a view to the long range. This is to be done through the flexible use of indirect methods of state-monopoly regulation, including such instruments as tax depreciation credits, antitrust and patent policy, and through the stimulation of industry's cooperation with the universities.

The forecast attaches great significance to the regular and extensive use of scientific and technical achievements in the decisionmaking process on the highest legislative and executive levels for the elaboration of government policy in various areas. Obviously, all of these proposals are aimed at a search for more intelligent decisions with a view to the progressive intensification of the basic contradiction of capitalism.

Scientific and Technical Priorities

According to the President's assistant for scientific affairs, G. Keyworth, the criteria used in setting the priority fields of scientific research are excellence in the case of fundamental research and pertinence in the case of applied research. Special attention is given to the fields where the progression of science is most intensive. The selection of priority projects must also be "consistent with national needs."⁸ The use of the criteria of excellence and pertinence means that resources are redistributed in favor of some scientific fields at the expense of others. For this reason, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, which is headed by G. Keyworth and enlists the services of scientific experts for this purpose, strives to select the particular research fields which should receive maximum support from the government and from private industry.

This approach signifies the rejection of the previous idea about the equal impact of concentrated R & D investments in any field. "I do not think that research projects can be ranked in order of importance from 1 to 50, but the top 10 and bottom 10 can be determined with some degree of accuracy," Keyworth said. "I do not agree with the view that valid decisions cannot be made in this respect."⁹ The scientific and technical priorities included in the NSF forecasts represent an attempt at this kind of ranking. What are these priorities?

MILITARY SPACE RESEARCH. The scale of priorities in the 1982 forecast is strikingly different from the previous one. In the latest forecast the top

places have been taken by "national security" and "space," and such spheres as "materials" and "the electronic revolution" have disappeared. The development of the two main fields, according to the forecasters, is dictated primarily by the need to improve weapon systems. The engineers of U.S. scientific policy have displayed their willingness to involve the nation's scientific and technical potential even more closely and deeply in the current administration's militaristic preparations. In this context, the forecast represents a camouflaged form of lobbyism in the interest of the military-industrial complex. "Science and technology have made fundamental changes not only in the nature and scales of military conflicts, but also in the very essence of strategic war and the possibilities of attaining national goals. For this reason, the efficient functioning of scientific and technical potential has become an important element in all geopolitical plans."¹⁰ The forecast advises an increase in federal investments in military R & D of an applied and fundamental nature in the next few years.

Major fields of scientific research--microelectronics and new materials--have been subordinated to military interests. In electronics, efforts are to be concentrated on the creation of super-speed integral circuits and midget electronic components for the next generation of computers, missiles, radar systems and intelligence data control and processing centers. Research in the field of man-made intellect will focus on the broader use of robots for military purposes. The development of programming software will be increasingly important in the future. The Department of Defense is already allocating 5 billion dollars for this purpose each year.

In the study of materials, the emphasis will be on the development of carbons and other composite materials with a metallic matrix and on the technology for the super-fast cooling of metal alloys. This is supposed to enhance specific properties of materials and reduce U.S. dependence on imports of several strategic metals. Research fields related to national security include the development of space weapon systems and the collection of intelligence data, as well as the training of skilled scientific personnel for the Pentagon.

It is assumed that the results of military R & D in these fields will also be used in civilian sectors of the economy. It is true that some of the results of military research in the fields of microelectronics, robots, mathematical software and new materials will be used in some way for civilian purposes. But this process will be inhibited more and more by the diametrically opposed developmental aims of military and civilian technologies. There is no doubt that the transfer of resources invested in military R & D programs to peaceful programs would have an immeasurably greater economic impact than isolated cases of the use of military space technology in civilian branches.

In space research the main projects will concern the development of the space shuttle system, space astronomy and communication satellites. Broader international cooperation and simultaneous competition in space research for peaceful purposes are anticipated.

POWER ENGINEERING AND TRANSPORTATION. Scientific policy in the field of power engineering in the next few years will assign priority to private investments

in power engineering R & D rather than to government expenditures. The latter will be connected only with long-term programs with a high degree of risk and a high potential return--for example, the development of breeder reactors or thermonuclear synthesis. Energy consumption will rise at a rate of slightly over 1 percent a year up to 1990. An important new feature will be the much broader government support of research in nuclear power engineering. The United States now has 72 nuclear power plants. By 1995 the number is to rise to 190 and they are to cover 30 percent of the nation's need for electric power. A model thermonuclear power system should be operating by 2000.

The development of alternative sources of energy--synthetic fuel, biomass conversion, solar energy and others--is regarded as a job for industry.

The more efficient use of energy in transportation will remain the major objective in the near future. Transportation consumes 25 percent of all of the energy produced in the United States, and 50 percent of the oil. Important results are anticipated in motor and air transport, particularly in the automobile industry, as a result of the development of a mass-produced two-seater vehicle and an efficient electromobile, as well as the use of alternative fuels with a coal or biomass base; in aviation these results will depend on the development of a progressive turboventilator engine and laminar air flow control.

The present rates of development in transportation are such that the U.S. transport system will exhaust its potential within 5 years.¹¹ In connection with this, the research and development of automatic air and vehicle traffic control systems will be extremely important. In combination with the study of the operator's behavior in the man-machine system, this should simultaneously heighten the efficiency and the safety of transportation.

The anticipated rise in the proportion accounted for by coal in the energy balance will make the study of the dynamic characteristics of coal and water mixtures for the development of pipeline transport systems quite pertinent.

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS. Researchers in this field will have to decide how to overcome limitations connected with the depletion of several minerals, the need to import a number of crucial strategic raw materials, seasonal shortages of fresh water and the expansion of areas "unsuitable" for cultivation.

Science's part in overcoming the first limitation will take the form of three related approaches: the further improvement of mineral prospecting methods; the more efficient extraction and processing of raw materials; the creation of substitute materials.

As for water resources in the United States, 20 percent of the 106 watershed regions are now experiencing a severe water shortage, and by 2000 the number will double. Science and technology can contribute to the correction of the water shortage by working out new methods for the redistribution of water resources, by improving the quality of water from existing sources and, what is most important, by promoting more efficient water consumption.¹² The

forecast concludes that the redistribution of water resources among reservoirs is an ecologically ineffective way of solving the problem of supplying all regions of the United States with water.¹³

Some of the conservation measures taken by the government in the 1970's were not effective enough, according to the NSF experts, because the technology needed for their implementation was lacking; as a result, it turned out that government standards were supposedly too costly, and this had a negative effect on economic development in a number of cases. In the next 5 years research in this field will focus on the atmospheric consequences of the use of mineral fuel, the prevention of damage related to non-nuclear hazardous and toxic waste and the protection of air and water basins.

AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS. The significance of science and technology in agricultural production efficiency is viewed from three vantage points: guaranteed supplies of the most important resources (land, water and nutritive substances); the augmentation of yield and productivity; the preservation of agricultural products en route to the consumer.

The limited quantity of land suitable for agriculture is expected to be the main factor slowing down the growth of labor productivity in this field in the next decade. In this connection, great importance has been attached to the encouragement of land conservation. American agriculture uses 80-85 percent of all the fresh water consumed in the national economy, and research aimed at the efficient use of water will therefore be of great value. In the next few years significant progress is anticipated in the enhancement of irrigation efficiency, the lowering of desalinization costs and the cultivation of plants capable of growing in salty soils and of being irrigated with salt water, and even sea water. Problems connected with the supply of nutritive substances are being solved not by larger doses of mineral fertilizers but by a plant selection process producing vegetation capable of extracting and assimilating large quantities of useful substances from the soil and nitrogen from the atmosphere.

Plant yield will be augmented by the implementation of fundamental knowledge in molecular biology and genetics and the improvement of DNA recombination techniques to change the properties of plants with regard to a broad range of characteristics. The achievements of genetic engineering and embryology will constitute the basis of research aimed at heightening the productivity of livestock. Genetic methods will be used to improve the adaptability of plants to changing environmental conditions--precipitation, temperature and the content of nutritive substances in the soil--and to heighten the resistance of plants to a broad range of other factors.

The forecasters display considerable interest in the study of artificial growth regulators allowing for the precise scheduling of plant maturation dates and the acceleration of the growing cycle.

All aspects of the interaction of plants with the environment are to be studied. Progress in this field could lead, for example, to the development of theories of pest control based on comprehensive information about the

biology of pests, environmental peculiarities and the possibilities of chemical protection. A better understanding of the interaction of plants with the environment is also needed for the prevention of plant diseases because the majority of these diseases occur when plants move from one biosystem to another. This knowledge should help agricultural services react correctly to negative changes in atmospheric conditions, including, for example, the "acid rains" produced by high levels of atmospheric pollution with exhaust gases and the products of combustion.

The heightened effectiveness of agricultural production should be promoted by the reduction of product losses, which are estimated at 30 billion dollars a year in the forecast.¹⁴ Research should be conducted in two areas. The first will concern the incorporation of better preservation methods, such as radiation equipment and the improvement of traditional conservation methods. The second will concern the reorganization of systems for the gathering, shipment, processing and storage of agricultural products.

PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND EDUCATION. In the next 5 years, according to the NSF experts, medical research will concentrate on the following: the development of means and methods of disease prevention; problems connected with the abrupt aging of the American population; the struggle against drug addiction, alcoholism and cigarette smoking; the establishment of a more accessible and efficient national health system. The latter is particularly noteworthy because the country still does not have an integral health system. The broader use of genetic engineering in the development of new medicines and the control of hereditary factors has also been forecasted. Progress in the treatment of brain disorders is expected in connection with anticipated achievements in neurological medicine.

In education, research will focus on teaching theory, the use of electronic equipment in teaching and the improvement of mathematical instruction in the elementary and secondary schools. The forecast stresses once again that the overall state of national scientific and technical potential will depend directly on the quality of education on all levels.

It is clear that some of the proposals regarding the reorganization of the technical base of industry, transportation, agriculture and public services are based on objective and sound recommendations. They indicate, in the most general terms, that the most promising area of technological development in the United States is considered to be the transfer from various modes of external influence on the treated substance (mechanical, physical and chemical) to the submicron technological influence on the cellular, molecular and nuclear levels for the purposeful modification of the structure of organic and inorganic matter. Submicron technology is the key to the development of microelectronics and new biotechnological materials.

As a whole, however, the lack of connection between the recommendations in the forecasts and the socioeconomic environment and the limited possibilities of state-monopoly capitalism turn many of the interesting statements in these forecasts into a list of good intentions and reduce their practical value.

Inconsistency of Scientific and Technical Policy

The compilation of forecasts of scientific and technical development, even with all their inherent limitations and contradictions, is an indisputably new phenomenon in the set of state-monopoly regulation methods.

The two published forecasts reveal provisional features reflecting the fluctuations in the scientific, technical and economic policy of the administration. The forecast published in 1980 proposed traditional means of state-monopoly regulation in the sphere of scientific policy: an increase in R & D funds and the concentration of the research programs of federal agencies on projects promising better competitive potential in the future and thereby enhancing the role of the Department of Commerce in the attainment of national scientific and technical goals, the creation of centers of industrial technology and other measures consistent with Democratic ideas about scientific and technical progress.

In the second forecast (1982), an attempt is made to substantiate the main aspects of the current Republican administration's scientific policy.

As pointed out above, this policy calls for the accelerated rise of government expenditures on military research. In accordance with the program of budget allocations, they will be 70 percent higher in 1987 than in 1980. What is more, allocations for civilian R & D will decrease by 42 percent. As a result, by 1987 allocations for military space research can be expected to reach 85 percent of all government investments in science.¹⁵

Projected R & D Allocations of Reagan Administration
and Share of Military R & D, billions of dollars

<u>Appropriations</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
Budget R & D allocations	42.3	46.1	49.8	54.1	59.0
Military R & D	25.0	28.8	32.9	37.6	42.6
Percentage of military R & D in total	59	62	66	70	72

Compiled according to: "Research and Development AAAS. Report VII," Wash., 1982, pp 6-7.

Several steps have been taken at the request of big business to stimulate research in the private sector of the U.S. economy. The most important are the institution of a 25-percent tax credit on private investments in science and the reduction of the depreciation term of investments in R & D equipment from 5 years to 3.

Radical changes have taken place in power engineering research. Government research allocations for nuclear power engineering have increased, with a simultaneous decrease of more than two-thirds in R & D expenditures in non-nuclear power engineering. As a result, almost three-fourths of the Energy Department's research budget is earmarked for nuclear and thermonuclear power engineering.

There have been significant cuts in research allocations in the social sciences and humanities (to less than one-fourth of the previous NSF figure), which has put several research projects in economics, sociology, political science and psychology in jeopardy.

An important advance in the current administration's scientific policy is the emphasis on applied research. For this purpose, the NSF was reorganized and applied projects were declared "the primary responsibility of all NSF subdivisions and programs."

One of the Republican administration's important measures in the sphere of science policy was the reduction of government control in civilian R & D, the cancellation of several traditional instruments of state-monopoly regulation and the broader use of indirect stimuli, such as tax and depreciation privileges.¹⁶

In addition to the forecasts examined in this article, other attempts are also being made in the United States to determine scientific and technical prospects. They include a report by a presidential commission on the prospects and dangers of science and technology in the 1980's (1980) and the Congressional Research Service's report on science and technology in connection with economic advances (1980). These forecasts cover a longer period. They contain projections for the next 10 to 30 years.

The compilation of scientific and technical forecasts is an objective necessity consistent with the present developmental level of productive forces. However, the frenzied search for an escape from the state of crisis and the provisional nature of these forecasts make most of their proposals contradictory and premature.

The traditional means of governmental regulation, based on active governmental intervention in economic processes, and so-called "liberalism" were unable to cope with the nation's mounting problems. Their place has been taken by neo-conservatism, the main principle of which is the maximum satisfaction of the interests of big monopoly capital, primarily military-industrial corporations. It is precisely in this context that the development strategy proposed in these scientific and technological forecasts must be examined. This strategy is in striking contrast to the policy proposed and resolutely defended by the USSR. "If there is peace in the world," the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress says, "the creative energy of people, backed up scientific and technical achievements, will certainly solve the problems that are worrying people today."

Within the framework of capitalism's limited potential, attempts to formulate long-range policy are impeded by insurmountable obstacles connected with the selfish interests of monopolies and the contradictory nature of governmental measures in this sphere. For this reason, the reorganization of U.S. scientific and technical potential cannot be achieved with the aid of the strategy proposed even in the most competent forecasts. The process is taking place under the conditions of a fierce struggle between various opposing forces, and this struggle could give rise to new disparities and crises and thereby diminish the overall impact of scientific and technical progress.

FOOTNOTES

1. According to preliminary estimates, they will reach 85 billion dollars in 1983 (SCIENCE RESOURCES STUDIES HIGHLIGHTS, Wash., 11 June 1982, p 1).
2. SCIENCE INDICATORS 1980, Wash., 1981, p 33.
3. "The Five-Year Outlook: Problems, Opportunities and Constraints in Science and Technology," Wash., 1980; "The 5-Year Outlook on Science and Technology 1981," Wash., 1982.
4. The NSF has been publishing a periodical called SCIENCE INDICATORS for 10 years now. It contains analyses of the levels and tendencies of quantitative characteristics of R & D resources and other indicators of the effective functioning of this sphere.
5. KOMMUNIST, 1982, No 12, p 19.
6. For more detail, see A. A. Dynkin, "Stages in the Development of R & D in the Main Capitalist Countries," VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, 1980, No 7, pp 129-131--Editor's note.
7. "The 5-Year Outlook on Science and Technology 1981," p 50.
8. SCIENCE NEWS, 4 July 1981, p 4.
9. SCIENCE, 10 July 1981, pp 183-184.
10. "The 5-Year Outlook on Science and Technology 1981," p 81.
11. In accordance with the forecast, within the next 20 years the through capacity of the American transportation system will increase at a rate of 2 percent a year (per capita) for passenger traffic and 1.3 percent a year for freight.
12. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 11, pp 99-109.
13. "The 5-Year Outlook on Science and Technology 1981," p 139.
14. Ibid., p 165.
15. For the sake of comparison, expenditures on military space research in 1975-1980 accounted for 62-64 percent of all U.S. government expenditures on science.
16. According to some estimates, in 1981, even before the tax and depreciation privileges of "Reaganomics" were instituted, private firms were able to invest an additional 2 billion dollars in research projects as a result of corporate tax reductions.

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U.S. SOCIETY SEEN NOT PLURALISTIC BUT ELITIST

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 83 (signed to press 18 Mar 83) pp 18-29

[Article by G. K. Ashin: "'Pluralist Democracy' or an Omnipotent Monopolistic Elite"]

[Text] Theories of political pluralism occupy an important place among the ideological concepts that are being disseminated on a broad scale by the American propaganda machine. These theories are popularized by the mass media within the country and are exported. Furthermore, in recent years their export has been particularly apparent.

When American ideological agencies conduct their unscrupulous interference in the internal affairs of other states, they importunately advise the socialist and developing countries to change their political system in the direction of pluralism. Furthermore, the U.S. political system is held up as a model of "democratic pluralism." The political process in the United States is depicted as a truly democratic process, expressing the interests of the population and, what is more, taking its complexity and heterogeneity into account.

Poland has become a prime target of U.S. ideological sabotage. The slogan of political pluralism is being imposed upon antisocialist forces in Poland as part of their political program, whose general aim is the restoration of capitalism in this country. Polish counterrevolutionaries eagerly take instructions from abroad.

But here is an indicative fact. The intensive promotion of the model of the pluralistic political system for export has been accompanied by a decline in the popularity of these theories in the United States itself. The concept of political pluralism is being questioned more and more in works by objective American political scientists. Political analysts are also beginning to feel that American propagandists are exporting a shopworn ideological commodity which is no longer saleable in the domestic American market.

Let us take a look at the arguments over the nature of the American political system which have been so heated in the United States in recent years. The central disagreement is over the question of whether this system is pluralistic or elitist.

The complex and contradictory tendencies in U.S. politics at a time of the continuous exacerbation of the general crisis of capitalism motivated an agonizing "reassessment of values" in American political science. For decades the theory of political pluralism virtually reigned supreme in U.S. political science. Even now it is the leading theory and the most popular interpretation and rationalization of the bourgeois democratic system. It is highly respected by bourgeois politicians: At first glance, its premises appear to be temptingly "liberal," "classless" and "deideologized." It is not surprising that pluralism almost symbolizes democracy in contemporary bourgeois ideology.

American politicians, including all presidents of recent decades, have discussed pluralism with enthusiasm. When President J. Carter spoke at Georgia State University on 31 August 1979, he said: "We take pride in our diversity. Our pluralistic society is an important source of America's vitality and constructive energy." He then added: "But we must not allow this diversity to lead to discord and alienation."¹ Therefore, pluralism has certain permissible limits, the limits of the capitalist status quo.

The theorists of pluralism have been eager to call themselves the heirs of the democratic philosophical and legal traditions associated with the names of Montesquieu and Locke and of the American "founding fathers." Nothing seemed to foreshadow the end of pluralism's reign, but the symptoms of this decline were already becoming apparent.

One of the paradoxes of the concept of democratic pluralism is that it dominated bourgeois political science at a time when the explanation of the sociopolitical process in the capitalist countries from this standpoint was most vulnerable. The model of the pluralistic structure with its postulates of "diffused authority" revealed an incompatibility with the clearly defined tendencies toward the concentration of economic and political authority in today's capitalist countries. Strictly speaking, the concept of democratic pluralism never revealed the essence of capitalist sociopolitical relations. It can be regarded as the model of the idealized and romanticized bourgeois democracy of the free competition stage of capitalism. But it was precisely in the past that pluralistic theories were argued vehemently in bourgeois political science. And it was during the period of state-monopoly capitalism, when pluralistic models were most inconsistent with reality, that they "prevailed" in American political science and permeated official documents."²

Is this situation really so paradoxical? It is typical of the apologetic, protective ideology defending the capitalist status quo. The theory of political pluralism became a banal feature of bourgeois political science and a kind of symbol of general consensus. But this was a consensus without sufficient grounds. The very foundations of pluralistic theories were undermined long ago. Only those who turn away from reality can fail to see that the prevailing tendency in politics in the capitalist countries is the concentration and centralization of authority, the growth of executive influence and the decline of representative bodies and traditional bourgeois-democratic institutions.

The pluralistic model's increasingly obvious inconsistency with the real sociopolitical process in the capitalist countries is weakening its ideological

functions in the justification of the capitalist political system. Pluralistic theory has ceased to be the fig leaf covering the machinery of the bourgeois political system, although this was the capacity in which it was to serve. Several American political scientists have tired of using such an inadequate explanation of the sociopolitical process. A rebellion against the prevalence of the theory of pluralism can be anticipated within the depths of bourgeois political science. It is not surprising that the latest bourgeois political studies have said that "the orthodox pluralist current is being subjected to increasing criticism,"³ which is starting something like an "anti-pluralist revolution."

It is a well-known fact that pluralism depicts the political process in the capitalist countries as competition, concessions and compromises by numerous "interest groups" competing for a piece of the "pie" representing the advantages and benefits of the "industrial society." The pluralism of these groups and their competition, according to the supporters of this theory, guarantees that no one group will become a dominant elite. The assumption is that the multitude of "autonomous groups" will create their own organizations and can take part in the management of society, less by imposing their own will on other groups than by warding off threats to group interests from "both the government and other groups,"⁴ thereby creating a reasonable balance of power.

"Democratic pluralism" supposedly means that no one class or population group has a monopoly on power; the organizations expressing their interests act as "pressure groups" in dealings with the government, which is considered to be "classless." This model tries to fit the description of a "democratic process" in a contemporary society where there is no direct democracy. Although the individual does not participate directly in policymaking, there is the assumption that he can join an organization capable of influencing the government. Pluralists believe that the diversity of the contemporary society, which includes numerous groups--professional, religious, ethnic and regional--creates the potential for the education of organizations expressing these diverse interests. The question of class differences, the class struggle and the class essence of the state are carefully avoided as "Marxist extremes" (incidentally, Marxist criticism of the pluralist theories is ignored on the same grounds).

The classic work on pluralist democracy is generally thought to be A. de Tocqueville's "Democracy in America," with references to the works of D. Truman, D. Riesman and R. Dahl as the modern classics. Dahl writes: "The basic axiom in the theory and practice of American pluralism is the following: Instead of a single center of sovereign authority, there should be many centers, none of which should be completely sovereign." The author asserts that this allows "citizens and leaders to display their skill in the peaceful settlement of conflicts."⁵ The only problem is that the idealized portrait of bourgeois democracy is strikingly different from the state-monopoly reality.

C. Reich makes a much more truthful statement about the "decline of democracy and freedom" in the United States. "The nation," he writes, "is gradually turning into a rigid managerial hierarchy with a small elite and a huge mass with no civil rights. Democracy is losing ground quickly as more and more

authority is being seized by gigantic managerial institutions and corporations and decisions are being made by experts, specialists and professionals who are effectively isolated from the people."⁶

The incompatibility of the pluralist model with capitalist reality has been pointed out by some bourgeois sociologists in addition to the Marxists. C. W. Mills, the "problem child" of bourgeois sociology, dealt a severe blow to the ideology of pluralism. "The Americans do not want to give up the belief that the government is a kind of automatic machine regulated by the reciprocal balancing of conflicting interests,"⁷ Mills wrote and explained the social purpose of this concept: "When they talk about a 'balance of power,' this sounds like 'equal power,' and equal power seems quite fair and even honorable. But an honorable balance for one individual is often an unfair imbalance for another. Dominant groups enthusiastically declare the existence of a fair balance of power and a true balance of interests because they do not want their superiority to be undermined or violated."⁸

It must be said, however, that Mills himself is not totally free of pluralist illusions; he also has not fully overcome the influence of the related theory of balanced elites. He feels that the three main elites in American society--corporate bosses, government leaders and the upper military echelon--are equal. In his discussion of the interconnected interests of these groups, Mills writes that they are merging and forming a single ruling elite with undivided authority in the United States; and all of the talk about democracy in this country sounds like a joke.

A blow had been struck against pluralistic theory. After "The Power Elite," everyone who wrote about the structure of power in the United States from the pluralist standpoint--whether it was J. Galbraith or D. Riesman, D. Bell or R. Dahl--had to seek arguments to counter Mills' statements. Dahl accused Mills of using unconvincing logic and insufficient empirical proof. Bell called Mills a "vulgar sociologist." "Even if, as Mills insists, American policy is made by an elite," Bell said, "this is a constructive elite."⁹ In his famous book "The End of Ideology," he devoted an entire chapter to criticism of Mills, asserting that Mills used the term "elite" incorrectly, that he had not presented an empirical analysis of power in America, but only an outline, and that even the outline was unsatisfactory.¹⁰ But this criticism seemed more like a scolding than a meaningful analysis of Mills' ideas.

In the 1970's several American sociologists launched a frontal attack on pluralist theories (T. Dye, R. Zeigler, W. Domhoff). We will attempt to summarize their arguments against pluralism. One of the premises of pluralism is that the individual cannot influence policy on his own but can do this through participation in organized groups; this is why the U.S. population is united in numerous groups. American reality is far from this standard, however, and this has been demonstrated by a number of empirical studies.

For example, G. Almond and S. Verba proved that only 1 percent of the Americans believe that they can influence government decisions through their political party, and only 4 percent believe they can do this through any official group, including labor unions. In short, only a negligible minority "thinks in

pluralist terms"; the majority is "pre-pluralistic" in its views and relies on individual action. And it is not merely that the majority of Americans "have no direct contact with organizations that might represent their interests"¹¹ or that only a minority of the population belongs to any kind of association (including philatelic societies, animal protection societies, etc.). According to the supporters of the theories of the "mass society," which R. Hamilton calls the "pathological inversion of pluralist theory," the decline of autonomous associations is apparent in today's United States because these associations inevitably acquire bureaucratic features under the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism and cannot correct the alienation of the individual. What is more, these same groups evolve into a bureaucratic social structure and serve the manipulative elite as extra weapons.

Some of pluralism's critics have argued that voluntary associations and other "democratic organizations" are not really democratic. "The assumption that formal organizations are democratic is one of the basic premises of pluralism"¹² and, what is more, one of the shakiest. The critics of pluralism take R. Michels' "iron-clad rule of oligarchic tendencies" as their basis. Even if organizations, particularly political parties, were democratic at the time of their founding (and this is extremely debatable), with the passage of time they acquire an elite which serves its own interests. And if the formal organizations on which the pluralists place so much emphasis, W. Domhoff points out, are the product of an elite and are designed to serve its interests, their influence might be the opposite of what the pluralists presume.¹³ As a result, Hamilton concludes, "the theory of pluralism displays its total inadequacy" to describe how the political mechanism in the Western countries operates. "At best, there might be a limited pluralism, or a pluralism of the upper and upper-middle classes."¹⁴

This remark seems noteworthy to us. "Pluralist democracy" turns out to be democracy of the bourgeoisie, and not democracy of the people. The author unwittingly corroborates the Marxist belief that bourgeois democracy is of a restricted or limited nature, it is democracy for the minority, for the exploiters.

Finally, we should note the groundlessness of the claims that the theory of political pluralism is "deideologized." It is no secret that the concept of the end of ideology is an ideology defending the capitalist status quo, and that its ideal is the replacement of the class struggle with a compromise by various forces and reformist activity by authorities. Hamilton notes that although pluralistic theory "claims to be 'deideologized' realism, it proves to be an exceptionally useful and convenient ideology."¹⁵ It is convenient, needless to say, for capitalism.

We are naturally interested in the political and theoretical positions of the critics of pluralism. These critics make up a heterogeneous group, including both liberals and neoconservatives. As a rule, pluralism is criticized from the standpoint of an elitist view of the world. It is no coincidence that T. Dye, H. Zeigler and their colleagues are called "neo-elitists." In the words of Dye and Zeigler, they "challenged" pluralism. Without denying that the American elite is made up of different groups with their own specific

interests, they note that the differences between them pertain to secondary matters, while they all have the same interest in basic matters of substantial importance in the maintenance of the existing social system; what they have is a general agreement or consensus.

It must be said that the authors take a strong stand in general in their criticism of pluralism. But their positive program is extremely vague and they are inclined to promote the conservative-utopian dream about a "good," wise and farsighted elite capable of pulling capitalism out of its crisis. Furthermore, the crisis is given an extremely limited interpretation--as a crisis of "leadership"--and it is blamed on the nearsighted politicians who have used pluralist theory to cover up their own egotistical interests. In short, pluralism is criticized from an elitist position, although it is camouflaged somewhat by the adjective "democratic." For an understanding of why Dye and his colleagues are called "neo-elitists," we will take a look at the evolution of elitist theories, which have undergone several reversals and modifications.

The founders of the theory of elitism, V. Pareto and G. Mosca, regarded the division of society into an elite and a mass--the politically dominant minority and the dependent majority--as a condition of civilization. This basic postulate of elitism was accompanied by anti-socialist aims, the attempt to view social differentiation not from the standpoint of classes, but with a view to the "power submission continuum," the denial of historical progress (history is regarded as a group of social cycles distinguished by the ascendance of a specific type of elite) and the denial of the concept of popular sovereignty as a romantic utopian myth. Political inequality is openly acknowledged to be the basis of social life. Democracy is branded a myth: The people cannot rule because they are politically incompetent, the masses are apathetic, and in a state of "violence" they undermine the basis of society; finally, government by the people is technically impracticable.

In recent decades the emphasis has shifted in elitist theories. The reason is the growth of state-monopoly tendencies and the bureaucratization of capitalist society, heightening the influence and social prestige of bureaucratic strata; they are most often designated as the "new elites" (uniting top-level bureaucrats, managers and intellectuals). The "old" elite is the "elite by birth" and "elite by wealth." The "new elites," consisting primarily of corporate executives and government officials and representing a product of "Western educational institutions," are considered to have inherited the functions of the old elites and are expected to promote the creation of new types of social structures. Bourgeois futurologists (Bell, Kahn and Wiener) assign these groups the dominant role in the ruling elite of the future.

It is indicative that the authors of the theories of the "post-industrial" (Bell), "technotronic" (Brzezinski) and "new industrial" (Galbraith) societies have forecasted structural changes in the elite: The economic, political and military elite will give way to the intellectual elite. In 1980 a long article in U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, entitled "Our New Elite," stated that the upper stratum of intellectuals had turned into a "new class" dominating American "corridors of power." The main questions which were asked in the article were: "Will these people govern America?" and "Will this be for the better or for the worse?"¹⁶

According to Galbraith, the "technostructure," made up of an army of management experts and the technical intelligentsia, is gradually taking charge. According to Bell, universities and other cultural centers with close corporate ties are taking over the top positions in the social hierarchy; a scholarly elite is now a clearly separate element of the cultural elite. Bell feels that the centralization of technical knowledge (primarily in university centers) as the source of innovations and sociopolitical orientation, the classification of theoretical knowledge and the special role of "intellectual technology" are signs of the post-industrial society.¹⁷ According to Brzezinski, the "technotronic" society is distinguished by the new role of science, which becomes an instrument of total control over all facets of social life.¹⁸ A system is being created for the "scientific" manipulation of people's minds and the programming of their behavior in accordance with the interests of the elite.

The elitists' approaches to democracy are also changing. Whereas elitism was openly hostile to democracy in the beginning, some elitists tried to adapt its principles to bourgeois democratic institutions in the 1930's. J. Schumpeter and K. Mannheim redesigned elitism to this end. Schumpeter says it is time to stop confusing democracy with popular rule. Just as Mosca, he believes that public power is a myth. Instead of Lincoln's formula of "government by the people," he prefers "government approved by the people." He even gives the democratic government an elitist structure. The ruling elite is declared to be necessary in any society; the distinctive feature of democracy is the competition for positions of power by elites. Democracy is defined as a political system in which parties vie for votes, and the masses have a definite impact on policy by choosing between competing elites. In Schumpeter's "market" theory of democracy, various elites put their programs "on sale," and the "customer" masses accept or reject them.

Therefore, democracy is examined according to the model and semblance of the capitalist market: The citizen, representing the consumer, must have a chance to choose between policy lines just as he would choose between products. The role of the "mass individual" is purely passive; he chooses between finished programs worked out by the leaders of political parties.

The elitists reject the "naive" slogan of popular government proclaimed by the ideologists of the budding bourgeoisie. To preserve their democratic disguise, however, they offer the masses the assurance that although they will not control government, they can participate in the choice of a ruling elite, and the "best" of them can hope to become part of this elite. But even this surrogate democracy is false; the masses certainly have not chosen the monopolistic bourgeoisie as the ruling elite. At best, they are allowed to decide which of the capitalist parties will be in charge next. Another premise--about the possibility of the "mass individual" to become part of the elite--is just as hypocritical because even bourgeois authors have admitted that this elite is becoming more and more of an exclusive caste. According to F. Lundberg, the American elite has attained stability and its members are born to the mantle, like dukes. J. Mayer and J. Rumney make the gloomy statement that "the best advice to give a young person who is trying to climb the social ladder is to make sure that his father owns the ladder."

The integration of the principles of elitism by the theorists of bourgeois democracy is the best proof of the accuracy of Marxist criticism about its limited nature. "As long as capital exists, it prevails over the entire society, and no democratic republic or electoral system can change the essence of the matter."¹⁹

Numerous works criticizing the concept of the ruling elite have been published in the United States. Does this mean that elitism has ceased to be a characteristic feature of U.S. bourgeois ideology? Certainly not. The fact is that the publication of the books by C. Wright Mills and F. Hunter revealed that the analysis of the political structure in the capitalist countries from the standpoint of the concept of the ruling elite cogently exposes the limited, hypocritical nature of bourgeois democracy. It rips the democratic fig leaf off the "free world" extolled by bourgeois ideologists and reveals its "democracy" as domination by a financial capitalist elite. It is not surprising that J. Meisel called Mills the "patricide of the old theory of the elite."

Mills occupies a special place in American sociology. He acknowledges that society is divided into an elite and a mass, but this acknowledgement is turned into a passionate exposure of the state-monopoly structure. In connection with this, we could question the accuracy of the use of the term "elitist" by American sociologists to define those who accept the elite-mass division. There should be a distinction between normative and analytical approaches to the division of society into an elite and a mass and the term should be used to refer to those who regard this division as an eternal one and who see the elitist structure of society as the ideal. Although Mills admits that the United States is governed by an elite, he exposes the falsity of bourgeois democracy; it is easy to see that his ideal is anti-elitist. Dahl and other American sociologists mistakenly categorize Mills as one of the elitists, one of the "Machiavellians" for whom the analytical premise (the elite-mass dichotomy) becomes the norm.

Western sociologists reacted to the works of Mills and Hunter by rejecting the concept of a single elite; they found that it was more convenient to speak of a pluralism of elites rather than of a governing elite, and to discuss the "diffusion of authority" to camouflage the omnipotence of financial oligarchy. At the Fourth World Congress of Sociologists, V. Gattsman said that the concept of a single elite could not apply to "industrial societies," and J. Meisel asserted that the clearly defined dichotomy (elite-mass) was adequate only for an initial division and would have to be amplified for the sake of accuracy. He admitted that the theory of the elite had reached an impasse and that the development of civilization causes the "self-destruction" of elites. It is true that whenever there are numerous elites, whenever they can be found in any social stratum, society is regarded as a balance of conflicting forces and diverse groups, and the interests of each group are considered to be expressed by its elite. But the latter fact is no longer necessary to mention: In this context, the concept of the elite is so fragmentary that it can be paraphrased by stating that society represents a balance of "interest groups" (D. Truman) or "veto-groups" (D. Riesman). Elitist theories have turned out to represent integrated political pluralism. The term elite is lost in these concepts, although they are based on elitist premises.

The theory of elite pluralism became most influential in the United States largely because it takes into account certain real processes in the functioning of the state-monopoly system under the conditions of the maintenance of bourgeois democracy and stresses the increasing complexity of the power structure and the somewhat autonomous status of certain social groups within this dominant class. But these factors are exaggerated and the entire theory appears to be a more subtle apology for the political structure of contemporary capitalism.

Democratic freedoms, according to this theory, are not secured by the struggle of the masses, but by mutual differences and a balance of elites. The political, economic, bureaucratic, military and cultural elites "limit" or "restrain" one another. Each of them represents a relatively exclusive group, strictly guarding its own prerogatives and privileges against outsiders. This balance of elites has been declared the only possible type of democracy in the present era. By categorizing elites according to their functional characteristics, Western sociologists carefully conceal the class essence of each of these groups. They represent the exploiter class, divided into isolated and competing groups; this competition stems from the supposedly conflicting administrative functions performed by monopolies, politicians, generals, etc. The implication is that each in his own field does not perform the chief function of guaranteeing the necessary conditions for the exploitation of the masses by the monopolistic bourgeoisie.

If the theory of pluralism were sound, F. Lundberg notes, if important political and economic decisions in the United States were the result of compromise between approximately equal competing groups and each group took part in the decision-making process, there would be much greater equality between various population groups in the distribution of money, influence and prestige. "If decisions concerning the distribution of the basic economic resources are made collectively, then why is this distribution so unequal?"²⁰ This kind of decision is made by the "real elite"--the magnates of financial capital, the rich and the super rich, those who control more than 80 percent of all U.S. stock capital. What is more, despite all of the appealing declarations of the pluralists, this elite is "exclusive": Almost all of the top 0.5 percent of big property owners inherited their wealth.²¹

When we analyze specific reversals and fluctuations in U.S. policy, we cannot lose sight of the conflict of interests and the struggle within the ruling elite. But when it comes to defending the vested interests of monopolistic capital, this elite acts as a united front. It is no coincidence that even D. Eisenhower had to admit the prevailing influence of the military-industrial complex, which "is felt in each city, each state and each federal institution."

Therefore, even the neo-elitists have opposed these pluralist illusions, which have not stood up to empirical verification.

The central disagreement over the U.S. power structure is over the question of whether there is a ruling elite or elite pluralism. B. and P. Berger ask: "What is the nature of power? Which theory is right--the theory of the ruling elite in business or the multifactoral theory?"²²

In the 1950's and 1960's the center of attention was the argument between C. W. Mills and D. Riesman, which was summarized by prominent American political scientist W. Kornhauser.²³ Mills argues that real power in the United States is exercised by a narrow upper stratum and that the people actually have no rights. According to Riesman, the question of who wields power in America is debatable and "the situation is much more uncertain and vague" than it seems at first. Riesman sees the essence of the American political system (an essence which is sometimes distorted in practice) in the distribution of authority among various autonomous groups with veto power in the sphere of their own interests.

Mills outlines a pyramid of power in the United States, consisting of three levels: Real power is exercised by the ruling elite; the "middle" power level, reflecting group interests, plays a secondary role and is most noticeable in congressional lobbies; finally, there is the level of the "actually impotent" mass, or the politically passive public. The pyramid of power outlined by D. Riesman consists of two levels, which correspond roughly to the second and third levels in Mills' model. The top level in Riesman's pyramid consists of veto-groups engaged primarily in the protection of their own interests, and the lower level is the "unorganized public." Interest groups are trying not to dominate the "public," but to enlist its support as an ally in their maneuvers against the threatened restriction of their jurisdiction. This is why Riesman asserts that there is a pluralism of power structures and that power in the United States "seems situational and transitory."

Mills cites numerous facts testifying that real power in America is concentrated in the hands of an elite which excludes the masses from the public administration process. Riesman feels that the opinion that Wall Street rules America is an oversimplification. He rejects the idea of minority rule in the United States as a Marxist thesis or an "aristocratic," elitist approach, but he does admit that this was true in the past. Strictly speaking, Riesman does not feel that his ideal of balanced veto-groups already exists in the United States. He blames the lack of agreement between American reality and his model on unfortunate errors, the malfunctioning of control mechanisms and so forth. His bourgeois limitations do not allow him to admit the fundamental incompatibility of his veto-group ideal with the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism. His political pluralism is essentially an ideologization of the bourgeois-democratic freedoms of early capitalism.

Whereas Mills approaches an understanding of the real power structure in the United States, demonstrating that the power of the elite is based on the interrelated interests of corporate, political and military institutions, Riesman insists on the "dispersion" (or diffusion) of authority, reflecting the interests of the main "organized groups" (political parties, business, labor unions, etc.).

It must be said that both concepts have some connection with contemporary capitalist reality. The fact is that the increasing concentration of power in the hands of financial magnates has been accompanied by painstaking attempts to camouflage this process, to give it "democratic" outlines and to conceal its gigantic scales with propaganda. Mills reveals the significant relationship

in the development of contemporary capitalism--the concentration of power in the hands of the financial oligarchy and the elite groups dependent on it. He often ignores, however, the external features of the process and important symptoms for sociological analysis. This is precisely the difference between him and Riesman. Whereas the essence of the U.S. political structure is elitist, its facade has a democratic appearance. The means of this camouflage could be the subject of sociological and sociopsychological investigation. Riesman, on the other hand, concentrates on the relationships which cover up the omnipotence of the monopolistic elite, on the externally democratic and impersonal mechanism for the exercise of power by the elite and on the "modifications" of the specific social relationship.

Both of these aspects must be taken into account in sociological analyses. It is important to demonstrate that contemporary American society is elitist in its essence (Mills was able to do this), but it is also necessary to reveal the sociopsychological mechanism of elitist domination (the focus of Riesman's attention and something he has raised to the level of an absolute). It can be said that Mills is sometimes too literal and underestimates the complex indirect ways in which the elite exercises its power. The process whose essence Mills revealed fits Riesman's description on the surface. Both examine the same process, but the first examines its essence and the second examines its external features, its everyday appearance; one describes the process, so to speak, from within, while the other describes it from without.

In the 1970's this unfinished debate turned into neo-elitist arguments against pluralist theories of the elite.²⁴ The neo-elitists portray the following model power structure in the United States:

1. Power stems from role or position within the socioeconomic system. People gain power by occupying important positions in economic, financial, military and government institutions.
2. Power is "structural"--that is, power relations continue to exist regardless of election-related changes; the same leading groups continue to exercise power in society regardless of election results.
3. There is a clear distinction between the elite and the mass. Representatives of the mass can enter the elite only by occupying high positions in political institutions. Other representatives of the mass cannot penetrate the elite.
4. The difference between the elite and the mass is based primarily on control of society's economic resources; industrial and financial leaders make up most of the elite.
5. There is a process of convergence within the upper echelon of the political system; a small group is the prevailing influence in the majority of sectors of American social life--industry, finance, military affairs and foreign and domestic policy.
6. Members of the elite might disagree, but they are united by their agreement or consensus with regard to the preservation of the system and all of its

significant features in their present form, and they act jointly, particularly when the system is threatened.

7. The elite is not vulnerable to mass influence or only slightly vulnerable (through elections or other forms of mass political activity).

The supporters of elitism portray a different model power structure:

1. Power is the attribute of individuals in relation to one another in the decision-making process, regardless of their social or economic position.

2. Power relations are not necessarily constant. The network of relations in power groups formed for a single decision can be replaced by another network when another decision is being elaborated.

3. The differences between elites and the mass are disappearing. It is relatively easy for individuals to enter the ranks of decision makers (and just as easy to leave them).

4. Differences between elites and the mass are based primarily on the interest people have in making a particular decision. Leadership is fluid and mobile. Access to decision making can be obtained through the art of leadership, information about the problem, a knowledge of democratic procedure and so forth, and not only through wealth.

5. There are many elites. People who exercise power in the making of some decisions do not necessarily have power in making others. There are no elites dominating all areas of life.

6. There is competition between elites. Although the elites usually agree on the "rules of the game" in the democratic society, they are pursuing different political goals. Policy is the art of compromise among competing groups.

7. The masses can influence elites considerably through elections and pressure groups. The competition of elites makes them accountable to the masses.

Let us compare the two models. Is there any doubt that the first is closer to the truth? Nevertheless, the difference between the two is relative. The supporters of both defend bourgeois democratic institutions and their greatest fear is heightened activity on the part of the masses; they disagree only on the methods of curbing this activity.

A fear of the people and of their revolutionary spirit, which could threaten "legal" bourgeois democratic procedures, is a characteristic trait of contemporary bourgeois ideology. P. Bachrach writes about the radical transformation of bourgeois theories of the relationship between elites and the mass: "The classical theory of democracy proceeded from the belief that the people are sovereign and that the oligarchy threatens democracy by usurping power."²⁵ In contemporary bourgeois theories, however, the mass, and not the elite, is regarded as a potential threat to the democratic system, while the elite is regarded as its defender. Dye and Zeigler also write in this spirit.

"Democracy is 'government by the people,' but the responsibility for the survival of democracy rests on the shoulders of elites. This is the irony of democracy: Elites must govern wisely if 'government by the people' is to survive. If the survival of the American system depended upon an active, informed and enlightened citizenry, then democracy in America would have disappeared long ago, for the masses in America are apathetic and ill-informed about politics and have a surprisingly weak commitment to democratic values.... Fortunately for these values and for American democracy, however, the masses in America only follow their leaders...and respond to the proposals of the elites."²⁶

Therefore, we are dealing here with a "democracy" afraid of the people. This is truly the "irony of democracy." And it is a vicious irony. But why should democracy be the subject of irony? Let us state the matter more precisely. This is the irony of bourgeois democracy.

We have seen how the U.S. political system is reflected in the mirror of American political science and sociology. In this mirror, half-truths are combined with obsequious apologies, and political pragmatism is combined with functional descriptions of the sociopolitical structure.

Contemporary elitism is disguising itself in pseudodemocratic clothing, and this is the reason for the popularity of the concept of "pluralist democracy." American bourgeois sociologists assert in unison their fervent belief in democracy. To their great regret, they say, true government by the people is impracticable: In the age of technological revolution, public administration must be highly professional, and the masses are ignorant and incompetent. All of this supposedly makes non-elitist democracy impossible; this is why mankind must confine itself to the elitist form. In essence, this is not so bad, because the alternative to democratic elitism is not government by the people, but totalitarian dictatorship.

The ideological functions of the concept of "pluralist democracy" are obvious: They are to sweeten the pill so that the masses will find it easier to accept elitist bourgeois democracy and stop complaining.

But there is another alternative: It is true that genuine government by the people is impossible under capitalist conditions, but it is exercised in another, higher socioeconomic structure, which encourages the broadest segments of the popular masses to participate in the management of society.

FOOTNOTES

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PROBLEMS, UNIQUE FEATURES OF U.S.-CANADIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 83 (signed to press 18 Mar 83) pp 30-41

[Article by A. D. Borodayevskiy: "U.S.-Canada: Peculiarities and Contradictory Consequences of Integration"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Ronald Reagan's revival of the idea of concluding a broad U.S. agreement on integration with Canada and Mexico (North American Accord), which would envisage the creation of a North American economic community, has recently been the subject of lively discussion in Canada and the United States. In connection with this, there has been heightened interest in the problems of the U.S.-Canadian economic integration that has already been going on for a long time, and in the peculiarities, implications and prospects of this process.

As we know, imperialist integration is the highest form, and a largely specific one, of the process by which economic life is internationalized in the capitalist world. It presupposes not only the convergence and increasing interdependence of the states of a particular region, but also the close interpenetration and connection of their economies, the intermingling of national capital and the merging of national reproduction processes. The resulting reorganization of national economic structures makes them more interchangeable, and the structures themselves gradually become elements of a broader economic system and are integrated in an intergovernmental complex.

The intensification of intraregional division of labor, which stimulates the intensive development of specialization and cooperation by firms in various countries, is accompanied by the closer intermingling of national monopolistic capital. This gives new international bonds a strong and lasting nature. On this basis, profound changes take place in the reciprocal trade of the countries in the region, which loses its purely commercial nature and is more inclined to serve the production and technological ties between various links of transnational corporations and ostensibly independent companies (primarily on the basis of contracting and subcontracting relations).

At the same time, when integration develops on capitalist soil, it is the catalyst of inter-imperialist rivalry or even a source of friction in political relations between states.

Each of the regions of the capitalist world where integration processes have taken place has its own set of general and specific factors determining the tendency toward integration and its own specific historical conditions under which the process takes place. This is the reason for differences in integration systems in different regions, particularly the unequal ratios of elements of the system and the peculiarities of integration machinery. The regional U.S.-Canadian economic complex also has its unique features. Here integration processes have been influenced by a number of long-term factors connected with national economic features and the existing conditions of commodity and capital exchange between these countries.

These factors include, above all, the approximately 10-fold difference between the populations of the United States and Canada (obviously, this sets natural limits on the size of the market and the growth of economic potential) and the difference in overall scales of economic activity, reflected in the size of the GNP and other comprehensive cost and natural indicators (energy output, steel production, industrial and agricultural volumes, etc.). There is also the historically determined, relative financial weakness and low initiative of Canadian private capital, which developed at first "in the shadow" of the British bourgeoisie, and later in the imposed role of the junior partner of American big business. Canada's rich natural resources and their complementary (or supplementary) relationship to the U.S. raw material base constitute another important factor.

Besides this, the process of integration has been influenced considerably by the virtually total absence of limitations on the regional circulation of short-term and even investment capital, the conversion of national currencies, transactions in the partner country's securities, the transfer of profits, the migration of manpower and the transfer of personal income over the border--an entire group of incentives for the direct intermeshing of capital markets and reproduction processes.

Last but not least, geographic and historical conditions are an important factor: The countries are neighbors with a common history, prevailing capitalist economic principles, ethnic similarity, a common language and common cultural traditions (their unique features do not inhibit economic convergence).

In the past, the combined influence of all these factors stimulated the vigorous penetration of the Canadian economy by American capital and motivated the miniature Canadian industrial system to establish close ties with the southern neighbor's strong economic potential. Specific forms of North American integration and its mechanism took shape under the influence of these factors. Here it is significant to note that these factors are also the reason that it developed as the "integration of unequals" from the very beginning, as a system for the attachment of Canada in the form of a raw material "periphery" to the American industrial "nucleus."

The group of these factors is the key to an understanding of the reasons for the "newly discovered" nature of the Canadian economy, its clear orientation toward foreign sales markets, the peculiarities of its production structure, which is largely subordinated to the needs of American monopolies, and the

relatively low level of INTERNAL integration in the Canadian economy, which appears to be divided into "substructures" of provincial economies that are often more involved in economic exchange with adjacent American states than with one another. Apparently, this is also the source of Canadian "nationalism," a natural reaction for a nation which has developed and strengthened its own governmental system, realized the unique nature of its own historical course and faces the danger of losing these gains through dilution in the genetically similar, but nonetheless alien, American socioeconomic system.

No attempt will be made in this article to prove that the United States and Canada have reached the integration stage in the internationalization of capital and production or to summarize the features of the merger and intermeshing of reproduction processes in the two countries. There are Soviet works which deal expressly with the CONTENT of North American integration and its CONTRADICTIONARY EFFECTS on the weaker partner.¹ This article has a different purpose: Above all, the author wants to compare processes on the state-monopolistic and private-monopolistic levels in order to delve more deeply into the PECULIARITIES of the integration mechanism in this region; to examine the INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE serving and regulating the integration process; to describe, in the most general terms, its effects on the economies of the two countries for a more accurate assessment of its POSSIBLE PROSPECTS.

Private Monopolistic and Intergovernmental Levels of Integration

In contrast to the process in Western Europe, the mechanism (and functioning) of the regional U.S.-Canadian economic complex was distinguished by an almost total lack of "initiative from above"--that is, bilateral intergovernmental measures of a regulating or stimulating nature. At the same time, "initiative from below," or the private monopolistic basis, was quite strong. As a result, integration processes have developed primarily on the microlevel, and the most intensive development has been witnessed in capital ties and in specialization and cooperation by firms. "The fabric of American-Canadian relations is so dense on the non-governmental level," noted American researcher W. Diebold, Jr., "that the interaction of the two countries on this level is much more indicative than their conventional intergovernmental relations."² A group of researchers from Carlton University ascertained: "In the case of Canada and the United States, the internationalization of economic life through the efforts of private capital has progressed quite far."³

Decades of the intraregional mingling of capital (primarily through the augmentation of the scales and structural-territorial sphere of American direct investments), accompanied by division of labor, did much to make the Canadian national economy structurally subordinate to the United States and dependent on it and resulted in the perceptible merger of reproduction processes in the two countries. Ample proof of this can be found in data on their reciprocal trade, which exceeded 86 billion dollars in 1981. Canada, with a population equivalent only to around one-tenth of the population of the EEC countries, imports approximately the same quantity of U.S. goods as these countries combined. Its share of American imports and exports ranges from one-fifth to one-fourth, and in the case of some goods Canada is U.S. industry's main foreign supplier.

... that American monopolies were able to direct the development of the Canadian economy into channels convenient for them without any kind of national organization of the integration type simply underscores the active role and indisputable priority of private capital in the creation of the integration system. As for the government, its role essentially consisted only in the establishment of the conditions (or basis) for private monopolistic integration in the form of a specific climate.

Whereas integration processes in Western Europe began when the "big six" (the original EEC members) set up the Common Market, and the movement of capital and manpower across borders was liberalized only later, in North America the free migration of capital existed from the very beginning--giving American monopolies tremendous "odds" in the development of foreign economic expansion, which they used skillfully to dominate many spheres of the Canadian economy. The unimpeded movement of commodities came much later and, what is most important, was much more limited, applying to only three--although quite large--groups of manufactured goods (motor vehicles and the parts for them, agricultural machinery and military goods).

Incidentally, the possibility of duty-free (or low-duty) imports of unprocessed raw materials also existed for a long time in the United States, giving American TNC's in the resource field additional incentives for the intensive penetration of Canada. It is also significant that the largest step in the liberation of bilateral trade--the famous "autopact" concluded in 1965 to promote more intense intrasectorial division of labor in the region and the development of specialization and cooperation--was taken at a time when the Canadian automobile industry was already controlled by American capital.

Therefore, the structure of national customs duties which took shape in the 1920's and 1930's long perpetuated the status quo, the main feature of which was the prevalence of industrial raw materials in Canadian exports to the United States and of finished manufactured goods, designed primarily for the satisfaction of investment demand, in American exports to Canada.

The experience of West European integration testifies that an important part of its development is a group of measures to standardize the economic policy instruments of participating countries, including tax and credit systems and means of short- (market) and long-range (structural) national economic regulation. As for the North American region, here this kind of economic policy integration has been virtually absent, and not only with regard to the regulating instruments with the most restrictive effect on economic sovereignty but also in the case of the simple coordination of specific decisions in order to prevent conflicts that might reduce their effectiveness and lead to inter-governmental friction.

Of course, there is not and cannot be a total lack of coordination in the national economic policies of the two countries' federal governments because reproduction processes in the region are highly synchronized (displaying a high degree of integration directly in the production sphere) and there are significant similarities in their means of direct and, in particular, indirect regulation of the economy, similar economic structures (ratios of physical

production to services) and similar problems facing government regulating agencies (the maintenance of employment, the struggle against inflation, the balancing of international payments and receipts, stimulation of regional development and positive structural changes, etc.), which are made more difficult to resolve by the close interaction of the two economies.

The loan capital market can serve as a vivid illustration of the spontaneous attachment of Canadian economic policy to American policy: The interest rate of Canada's central bank and the rates charged by commercial banks on credit, particularly short-term loans, on which the migration of "hot money" depends, are traditionally geared to American rates, and when the "free floating" exchange rate was instituted for the Canadian dollar in the 1970's these rates began to stay above the U.S. level, intensifying the flow of capital into the country, needed to compensate for its chronic negative balance of payments.

In spite of all this, the main instruments of economic policy in the two countries have retained specifically national characteristics and no mechanisms have been set up to coordinate their practical use. And something that is perhaps even more important and simultaneously quite surprising is the almost total absence of any kind of regional economic institutions. After all, "the two most closely connected capitalist countries," as famous Canadian Marxist scholar W. Clement called the United States and Canada,⁴ do not have any kind of general, comprehensive agreement regulating their economic relations and have even managed to get along without the conventional task forces in the spheres where integration has progressed the furthest. Even the fulfillment of the "autopact" is controlled separately by the two sides, which issue annual reports on the state of the automotive industry that often contain quite contradictory assessments.

Noting the "high level of continentalism (integration--A. B.) achieved in the sphere of power engineering," the authors of a prestigious Canadian study stressed that this "sectoral integration is based on the dominant position of American investors in the oil and gas industry and on Canada's excessive dependence on sales in the American market...and the creation of transcontinental oil and gas pipeline systems" and so forth. They immediately acknowledge that this integration "has not reached the point of joint decision making or a single energy policy."⁵ Complaints about the "weak institutional structure" that is supposed to settle conflicts in bilateral economic relations or help in their avoidance have also been more frequent in North American literature.⁶

In this connection, it must be said that the absence of a regional economic organization or a developed network of international regulating bodies in North America is not, in our opinion, a sign of immaturity or an indication that the integration process is in its earliest stage, but proof of the exceptional strength of American TNC's and the effectiveness of the organizational structure of regional business they have set up on a private monopolistic basis on the one hand, and the severity of intergovernmental conflicts in the region on the other.

American monopolists and their Canadian bourgeois partners apparently have no great need for a special economic-policy mechanism; otherwise, they would have

urged its creation or would have acquired some kind of analogue on their own, private monopolistic level. But even this analogue does not exist! There are numerous sectorial business groups and broader associations of industrialists on both sides of the border, but no UNIFIED--North American--organization of this type has ever been formed. Obviously, the joint organ of American and Canadian businessmen, the Conference Board, does not count because its competence extends only to the preparation of research reports and the organization of special conferences--that is, completely different functions from those performed by national associations of manufacturers. The same may be said of the Canadian-American Committee, a non-governmental organization uniting businessmen, labor union officials, scholars, etc. The coordination of economic policy on the level of firms is secured by the system of mutual participation and interaction by the two countries' monopolistic capital, and by the personal allegiances whose workings were so brilliantly and thoroughly revealed by W. Clement.⁷ On the level of sectorial associations of manufacturers, the same goal is attained as a result of constant official and unofficial contacts between their executives and more influential members.

One of the reasons for the absence of a developed institutional structure of integration consists in intergovernmental conflicts. Here we are referring primarily to Canada's reluctance to make any promises to its southern neighbor, in whose iron clutches it already exists. "Considering the tenor of public opinion in the country," Canadian economists K. Holsti and T. Levy wrote in this connection, "it would be a politically unjustifiable act to establish any kind of new organs (for the regulation of bilateral economic relations--A. B.) that might create the impression that Canada is willing to heighten its involvement in American affairs."⁸

Apparently, renowned Soviet economist Yu. V. Shishkov was right in principle when he wrote that the small capitalist countries are usually more interested in creating a mechanism of joint economic regulation and that this is "vitally necessary" to them because it is still more difficult for them to cope with unexpected developments in their national economy on their own.⁹ In the case of Canada, however, which is disturbed by the pervasive American "presence" in its economy and is feverishly attempting to maintain its independence and cultural uniqueness, its own "image" and its independent place in regional economics and politics, these considerations are obviously of secondary importance.

Institutional Structure of Regional Economic Complex

It would be wrong, however, to underestimate the significance of existing intergovernmental organizations, which have demonstrated their influence and a certain degree of effectiveness in several cases.

The first of these organizations, the International Joint Commission, was founded in 1909 to oversee the fulfillment of a Canadian-American agreement on border waters. This senior intergovernmental organization generally does not elaborate bilateral political decisions (although this is within its jurisdiction), but confines itself to advising the governments. Nevertheless, its activity has been quite effective because its recommendations have concerned

primarily the organizational and technical aspects of matters and have been based on expert opinions. Suffice it to say that the conditions for such large joint projects as the creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway and the use of the water resources of the Columbia River were worked out in this commission. The commission is also important because it has jurisdiction over 27 organs of a more private nature, most of which are in the research field.

In the sphere of economic decision making, the most influential organ is probably the Canadian-American Committee of Ministers of Trade and Economics, created in 1953. It guarantees the high-level discussion of bilateral problems. American experts, however, have said that it is not effective enough because it meets only sporadically. They feel that the committee's greatest service has been the elaboration and coordination of the terms of the "auto-pact."

A Canadian-American Interparliamentary group made up of 12 American congressmen and the same number of Canadian parliamentary deputies has been meeting annually since 1959. But these meetings are "more social than business-oriented," S. Tupper and D. Bailey write.¹⁰

In all, there were 18 bilateral intergovernmental bodies by the middle of the 1970's (no later data have been published). Five of them (the oldest) are concerned with problems in the regulation of border waters and coastal fishing.

The eight organizations founded between 1940 (the Permanent Joint Defense Administration) and 1958 (the Canadian-American Committee of Ministers on Collective Defense Affairs) are supposed to secure the "effective" attachment of the Canadian Armed Forces and military industry to the Pentagon's militaristic machine. The main organization in this group is NORAD (North American Air Defense Command), whose founding in 1957 signified the inclusion of the Canadian Air Force and air defense system in the unified "North American" system managed from Washington. As we know, the activities of NORAD are connected with the deployment of American missiles and military personnel in Canada, and the fact that this organization was renamed the North American AEROSPACE Defense Command in 1981 is proof, in the view of Canadian communists, of the intention to involve their country even more closely in U.S. aggressive plans and the strategic arms race.¹¹ Since the end of the 1950's, a special "executive group" has overseen the observance of the Canadian-American program of joint arms production.

Besides this, there are less influential organizations engaged in the coordination of monetary aspects of intergovernmental relations (the Canadian-American Committee on Balance of Payment Problems, founded in 1963), the joint maintenance of national parks (the appropriate commission was founded in 1964) and the regulation of conflicts in agricultural trade (the Canadian-American Technical Committee on Agricultural Sales, founded in 1967).

In the opinion of Canadian researchers, the most clearly defined "integrator" nature is an attribute of the intergovernmental organizations whose competence includes issues arising from the territorial proximity of the two countries (the use of coastal waters, fishing and the ecology of the border zone).

Obviously, this also applies to military organizations like NORAD. In contrast to these, the organizations designed to regulate conflicts over extremely acute problems in trade and monetary relations have a "minimum of integrator features"--that is, they are incapable of making any decisions that are at all binding for the two sides.¹²

Most of the bilateral talks connected with the coordination of interests in trade, economic, social and other areas, however, are conducted not by inter-governmental organizations but on the level of official and "direct unofficial" contacts between links of ministries and departments and their officials. These contacts are coordinated to some degree by many links of the American Congress (for example, the subcommittees on economic policy and inter-American economic relations of the Joint Economic Committee) and the Canadian Federal Parliament (for example, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs).

It must be stressed that the two sides have extremely unequal ability to influence one another. For example, renowned American economist H. Aitken acknowledged at the beginning of the 1960's, when the features of integration were not as distinct as they are now, that virtually any foreign economic decision made in Washington would influence the Canadian economy, while Canada could only influence the decision-making mechanism in the United States indirectly and only if its interests coincided with the views of a particular American pressure group.¹³ Of course, this does not mean that the potential of the "Canadian lobby" in Washington should be ignored, particularly since it includes representatives of many powerful American TNC's that have found a base in Canada and often have interests in common with Canadian manufacturers.

Finally, some mention should be made of the energetic "diplomacy" and negotiation conducted by representatives of the administrations of various Canadian provinces in Washington and in the capitals of American states, as well as the analogous negotiations of American state government officials in Ottawa, Edmonton, Vancouver, etc. But even here researchers have noted a higher level of activity of this kind on the part of provincial authorities than of state government officials, which can, in our opinion, be viewed as a sign of the greater dependence of the Canadian side on its neighbor's economic and political decisions, and not only on the federal level.

We would like to conclude this examination of the peculiar workings of the regional economic complex with the reminder that the relatively low number and limited nature of functions of intergovernmental instruments for the coordination of economic policy are, in the author's opinion, less indicative of weakness than of the INTERNAL strength of integration processes in subcontinental economic affairs, which are developing primarily on the private monopolistic level.

'Integration of Unequals': Benefits, Drawbacks, Prospects

As we know, economic integration is a natural, OBJECTIVE progressive process. It is interesting that as early as 1891, G. Smith, an active proponent of Canadian-American convergence, wrote that the map of the North American continent represents a single economic entity, and that any attempt to divide it

with the aid of customs borders is tantamount to declaring a futile war against nature.¹⁴

But this division did take place and economic development in the region was primarily confined to the national economic framework for a fairly long time. By the time that integration processes began to be developed in earnest, the participating countries essentially represented separate economic organisms--and, what is more, organisms difficult to compare in terms of strength and major economic parameters. For this reason, it is understandable that this integration, as an imperialist process, had far from equal effects on its participants; the weaker side has received fewer advantages from integration and has suffered a disproportionately high number of socioeconomic drawbacks and lost opportunities.

We will not discuss this matter in detail here, but we will note that integration made the American economy stronger by giving it a more solid raw material base, providing it with the incentive of a larger regional market and creating opportunities for convenient and strategically important investments. It appears that it is this regional economic complex, and not merely the U.S. economy, that now constitutes the economic foundation on which the strength of the American center of imperialism rests. Canada, however, has unique natural resources but still occupies a largely subordinate, "peripheral" position in international division of labor and has to fight to retain its "national identity" under strong outside economic and political pressure. In the West, present-day Canada is often called "a rich industrial underdeveloped country" or "the richest of the world's developing countries," despite its obvious membership in the "club" of rich industrial states.

Canadian communists say that their country "is not a colony or semicolony" and that "Canadian monopolists are no longer simply the junior partners of U.S. imperialists."¹⁵ At the same time, they underscore Canada's inferior position in the regional economic system and warn their motherland against the danger of further involvement in a close alliance with the world's first imperialist power.

There is no question that, as part of this system, Canada has climbed to the top U.S. level in terms of the basic structural, qualitative economic indicators, especially per capita GNP and social labor productivity. But it has paid for this by having its economy develop largely as a subordinate "segment" of the North American market, as a kind of continuation of the U.S. fuel and raw material base, while the processing sector of Canadian industry has developed as a "branch," with some restricted structural elements and parameters.

In the same way, the equalization of the basic macroeconomic indicators of the two countries (and this is a symptom of the overall Canadian process and simultaneously evidence of the development of integration) is reflected not only in "favorable" indicators, but also in such parameters with negative implications as the high rate of unemployment and inflation, the underloading of production capacities, etc. All of these indicators in Canada are close to the American ones, and even surpass them in some cases, because the conditions of regional integration have caused external stimuli emanating from the strong but diseased

U.S. economic organism to affect Canadian internal conditions and intensify negative processes in the national economy. It is not surprising that the inflationary rise in Canadian prices has been measured in double-digit figures in recent years (over 11 percent in 1982) and that the rate of unemployment has approached 13 percent.

The equalization of the main economic indicators has been accompanied by the perceptible synchronization of economic processes. American monopolists frequently take advantage of economic integration to "export" some of the negative consequences of cyclical and structural crises in the United States to their Canadian neighbor. "The latest tendencies in Canadian economic policy and in economics in general," wrote experts from the Howe Research Institute, who could hardly be accused of biases against integration with the United States, "stemmed primarily from events in the United States." Furthermore, Canada's ability to influence its partner's economy is not comparable to the American influence in terms of scale, intensity and consequences.

Many researchers have noted that the level of capital concentration in Canada has recently been higher than in the United States as a result of integration, particularly in industries controlled by foreign capital.¹⁶ "Although the level of concentration (of capital--A. B.) in the U.S. economy is high," W. Clement wrote, "it is far below Canada's level; in general, U.S. industry is much more highly dispersed." In connection with this, the following remark by Clement is particularly important: "The higher degree of concentration in the Canadian production sphere is primarily a result of American direct investments and reflects the intensification of disparities in the Canadian economy as a result of uneven development."¹⁷

The problem of uneven and disparate development also has its territorial aspect. "Canada's integration with the United States," Soviet researchers noted, "has 'regionalized' the national economy, strengthened vertical ties (that is, North-South--A. B.) and weakened horizontal ones."¹⁸

It is true that during the integration process the "polarization effect of economic development prevails over the territorial dispersion effect."¹⁹ Highly concentrated enclaves of production by American monopolies are coming into being in Canada. These monopolies are striving to intensify division of labor and establish strong ties in production and distribution with the U.S. economy complex rather than with the Canadian economy. In this sense, regional integration is a factor inhibiting the integration of the INTERNAL (national) economic structure and even giving rise to centrifugal tendencies and disintegration.

Although we have no statistical proof, it is quite probable that in some parts of this region (for example, Ontario-Michigan, Quebec-New York or Vermont, Alberta-central northern states) stable North-South economic ties are already more intensive than "horizontal" ties, not only in Canada (for example, Ontario-Manitoba-Saskatchewan-Alberta) but also in the northern United States (Washington-Montana, North Dakota-Minnesota) and perhaps in the United States as a whole. The fact is that the part of Canada bordering on the United States (southern Ontario, Quebec and Alberta) is the location of most of

Canadian industry, which is working for the American market, and the economic structures of the corresponding Canadian provinces and American states are highly intersupplementary while division of labor among them is stronger than in the region as a whole or in the two national economies.

When North American researchers compare the benefits and drawbacks of regional integration for Canada, they draw up long lists of the implications of the operations of hundreds of American TNC's and their diversified production system in Canada, the fact that the Canadian economy is geared to foreign markets, its strong dependence on imports, etc. For example, the positive implications include the convenience of reciprocal sales of Canadian oil and gas and American coal and exchanges of the "oil for oil" and "gas for gas" type, in which there is a savings in transport costs and a better fuel supply for regions poor in energy resources. In the processing industry the list includes the relatively easy access to American technology for the branches of American TNC's in Canada, the resulting savings in R & D costs, the opportunities of the same branches to use the sales network of parent companies in the United States and the higher level of production efficiency of American firms in Canada in comparison to national firms (particularly in terms of added value per worker).²⁰

The list of negative implications, however, is much longer. Here are just some of the arguments of North American critics of the present nature of U.S.-Canadian economic ties. The Canadian economic structure is burdened by disparities, raw materials are being pumped out of the country, mineral deposits are threatened with depletion and the chief advantages of the processing of these minerals are attained by American TNC's, which have forced Canada to accept a type of vertical integration in which the highest links of the technological chain are located in the United States. Branches of American monopolies in many "secondary" sectors of the Canadian processing industry, specializing in the manufacture of finished goods, are distinguished by the same kind of weak specialization as national companies. As a rule, these branches have to base their export policy on instructions from the headquarters of parent companies, and this can restrict their initiative considerably. Technology obtained through intraorganizational channels is often outdated and is not at all free of charge. According to some estimates, branches of American companies spend only half as much on their own original R & D as Canadian national companies, and this holds out no promise for the country in view of its already significant underdevelopment in this area. At the same time, the branches consume relatively larger quantities of imported goods (mainly finished goods), which puts an additional strain on the country's balances of trade and payments, etc.²¹

It is also significant that a large portion of U.S. direct investments in Canada in the postwar decade was not accompanied by any real expansion of the industrial production system--that is, the equipping of new mines, the construction of plants, etc. According to W. Clement's data, current (new) U.S. direct investments in Canada have been distinguished by a much higher percentage of expenditures connected with the acquisition of control over already operating national industrial firms than American direct investments in other countries; furthermore, this percentage has risen steadily.²²

The domination of the economy by American capital is the main reason for the considerable exacerbation of Canadian-American economic and political conflicts in recent years. They include the friction connected with the Trudeau government's national energy program, the conflict over coastal fishing, which reached an impasse at the start of the Reagan Administration, and the pollution of the Canadian environment by the "acid rains" resulting from highly concentrated industrial activity in adjacent U.S. regions. Many economic problems have become integral elements of the agenda of bilateral intergovernmental talks on the highest level in recent years.

The exacerbation of U.S.-Canadian conflicts provided the grounds for the fairly pessimistic forecasts of future North American integration in recent years. A poll of the members of one bilateral Canadian-American organization indicated, for example, that the majority anticipated "a drop in the general level of Canadian-American economic integration and a simultaneous increase in conflicts by 1985."²³ A similar survey of North American experts on international affairs, conducted by Canadian researchers D. Manton and D. Svenson, indicated that in the 1980's "Canada will apparently be more, and not less, integrated with the United States, but there will be more, and not less, conflicts between their governments."²⁴ The second opinion is probably closer to the truth: It is not likely that integration processes in the region will stop, but it is completely obvious that they will be of an even more contradictory and conflicting nature.

On the level of theory, it is probably impossible to say quite definitely that there will or will not be a "free trade zone" or other economic group made up of two or more countries in North America in the near future. There are not enough spontaneous forces of economic convergence on the microlevel to create this kind of zone. In contrast to several other elements of the integration process, regional customs liberalization necessarily presupposes coordinated intergovernmental decisions. But they will be complicated simply by the painful effect "customs disarmament" could have on the Canadian national economy in view of the strength of its trade partner. In addition, this step would be related too closely to the entire group of bilateral intergovernmental relations, including the political future of the country and its status on the subcontinent.

At the same time, it is certainly not true that the future of North American integration will depend directly on the possibility of the further liberalization of trade. However important this might seem, it is only one element of the integration system. It is possible that no new steps will be taken to expand the sphere of "free trade" between the United States and Canada within the near future, but this does not mean that the objective process of integration, which is largely a spontaneous process of merger and increasing interpenetration by national economies under capitalist conditions, will stop in the region.

In any case, the process of integration as a whole is strengthening the United States' international position in its competition with the two other centers of imperialism--Western Europe and Japan. At the same time, the integration and consolidation of regional economic strength under U.S. auspices will

intensify this competition and increase the scales and complexity of inter-imperialist conflicts.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, T. V. Lavrovskaya, "Integration Process in North America: General and Specific Trends," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1978, No 3; T. V. Lavrovskaya, "Problems in U.S.-Canadian Economic Integration," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1982, No 8.
2. "Natural Resources in U.S.-Canadian Relations. Vol 1. The Evolution of Policies and Issues," edited by C. Beigie and A. Hero, Jr., Boulder, 1980, p 350.
3. H. von Riekhoff, J. Sigler and B. Tomlin, "Canadian-U.S. Relations: Policy Environments, Issues and Prospects," Montreal, 1979, p 18.
4. W. Clement, "Continental Corporate Power. Economic Elite Linkages Between Canada and the United States," Toronto, 1977, p 21.
5. H. von Riekhoff, J. Sigler and B. Tomlin, Op. cit., p 67.
6. "Natural Resources in U.S.-Canadian Relations," p 192; see also, R. Burns, "Conflict and Its Resolution in the Administration of Mineral Resources," Kingston, 1976.
7. W. Clement, Op. cit., pp 172-182, 251-288.
8. "Canada and the United States: Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations," edited by A. Fox, A. Hero and J. Nye, N.Y.-London, 1976, p 308.
9. Yu. V. Shishkov, "Formirovaniye integratsionnogo kompleksa v Zapadnoy Yevrope: tendentsii i protivorechiya" [The Creation of the Integration Complex in Western Europe: Tendencies and Conflicts], Moscow, 1979, pp 324-325.
10. "Canada and the United States. The Second Hundred Years," N.Y., 1967, p 132.
11. COMMUNIST VIEWPOINT, July-August 1981, p 6.
12. "Canada and the United States: Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations," p 286.
13. "Problemy istoriografii Kanady" [Problems in Canadian Historical Scholarship], Moscow, 1981, pp 275-276.
14. G. Smith, "Canada and the Canadian Question," Toronto, 1971, pp 223-224.
15. COMMUNIST VIEWPOINT, July-August 1981, p 35.

16. See, for example, V. A. Tishkov and L. V. Koshelev, "Istoriya Kanady" [The History of Canada], Moscow, 1982, p 193.
17. W. Clement, Op. cit., pp 139, 140, 141.
18. "Kanada na poroge 80-kh godov. Ekonomika i politika" [Canada on the Threshold of the 1980's. Economics and Politics], edited by L. N. Bagramov, Moscow, 1979, p 32.
19. "Canada and the United States: Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations," p 261.
20. B. Wilkinson, "Canada in the Changing World Economy," Montreal, 1980, pp 73-74; S. Globerman, "U.S. Ownership of Firms in Canada," Montreal, 1979, pp 17, 18.
21. B. Wilkinson, Op. cit., pp 69-70, 71, 74-75; "A Citizen's Guide to the Gray Report," Toronto, 1971, pp 56-107.
22. W. Clement, Op. cit., p 88.
23. H. von Riekhoff, J. Sigler and B. Tomlin, Op. cit., p 113.
24. "Canada's Foreign Policy: Analysis and Trends," edited by B. Tomlin, Toronto, 1978, p 193.

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ATTEMPT TO BOYCOTT LOS TREATY SEEN ENDANGERING U.S. INTERESTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 83 (signed to press 18 Mar 83) pp 42-49

[Article by Ye. Ye. Yakovin: "The Law of the Sea: Reality and Washington's Illusions"]

[Text] The establishment of global law on the seas and oceans has become a practical reality of our day. The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which concluded its years-long marathon* in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982, reached mutually acceptable compromises on all of the acute problems of maritime law. The resulting UN convention on the law of the sea was signed by the overwhelming majority of states, including the Soviet Union. The USSR views the convention as an important political and international legal document designed to strengthen peace and cooperation on the seas.

"At no time in the history of international relations," UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar said in this connection, "have so many countries immediately signed the results of their talks, thereby consenting to act in accordance with their obligations.... The new law of the sea not only represents the result of actions and reactions by the strongest powers, but is also a product of the determination of the overwhelming majority of states, located in all parts of the world and distinguished by different levels of development and different geographic features in relation to oceans."

The statement by the UN secretary general reflects the significance of the UN convention, which will establish a new legal order of peace and cooperation in the world ocean. The convention not only clarifies and amplifies traditional maritime law but also introduces several absolutely new concepts as standards of international law:

The width of territorial waters is set at 12 nautical miles (1 knot = 1.8 km), but the peaceful passage of foreign boats and ships through these waters is allowed;

Boats and planes are allowed unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international shipping;

* See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1975, No 2; 1979, No 12; 1981, No 11--Editor's note.

The littoral countries will acquire sovereign rights to a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, extending to all of its natural resources and all commercial activity within this zone. But all states will retain the right of free air and sea navigation in these zones and other related freedoms;

The littoral states will have the sovereign right to exploit the continental shelf up to 350 miles from shore;

Countries without access to the sea will have the right of access and the right of transit for all types of transport through the territory of other states.

Washington officials took an openly hostile stand on the convention. As early as summer 1982 President Reagan announced that the United States would not sign it. At the last session of the LOS conference, the American delegation signed only the final act. At that time the White House sent former Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld to the capitals of the Western countries with a personal message from the American President, demanding a show of "solidarity" from the Western allies. Under this pressure, the governments of England, the FRG, Italy and some other Western countries have still not signed the convention. But they have not excluded the possibility of signing it in the near future because they realize that the provisions of this document are in the interest of all groups of states in the world.

What are the reasons for the American administration's hostile attitude toward the convention?

Much was written in the American press about the fact that when Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, he and his administration had an extremely limited understanding of the compromises reached with the active participation of the American delegation that had represented successive Republican and Democratic administrations during the many years of talks. This delegation was, to put it plainly, driven away, and this certainly could not arm the new administration with sufficient experience and knowledge regarding the complexities of the all-encompassing "package" of compromises and mutual concessions. But this was not all.

Washington then attempted a complete turnabout in its policy on the law of the sea. The earlier, more or less realistic policy of participating in the creation of a new maritime legal order, within the framework of an all-encompassing convention, was replaced with the line of disrupting this order, obtaining unilateral advantages for the United States and securing American control. This was part of the Reagan Administration's general line of confrontation and the use of force in all areas of world politics and economics.

At the 10th Session of the conference, which had actually finished drafting the convention and had entered the stage of its adoption, the new administration essentially took a stand against the entire international community. The authors of the new U.S. foreign policy line were obviously dissatisfied with the conference as a means of regulating problems in the world ocean on the basis of equitable talks and a mutually acceptable "package." Washington's

struggle against the convention, which was intended to nullify all of its work or at least prolong the conference indefinitely, passed through three stages.

In the first stage, throughout 1981, the United States used the pretext of "reviewing" its position to exclude itself from the concluding talks on the convention text. The conference postponed its signing, pending the completion of the U.S. "review." But the efforts of the new members of the American delegation at the conference and the propaganda campaign in the American press were intended to prove that the convention was not in the strategic and economic interests of the United States and that it therefore required radical revision. This tactic concealed the strategy of boycotting and undermining all previous work. The conference waited a year and then resolved to adopt the convention in 1982.

In the second stage, in spring 1982, during the last, 11th working session of the conference, the United States finally put forth its concrete proposals on the text of the document. Admitting that the provisions of the convention not pertaining to the law of the sea were acceptable to it, Washington submitted a bombastic "green paper" of amendments, which would affect all of the basic provisions regarding the exploitation of sea bed resources and the creation of an international organ for this purpose. These amendments were of a deliberately rigid nature and were intended to restrict the interests of the "Group of 77" (the developing states), the socialist countries and some Western states. In particular, the United States proposed a "commensurate balloting" procedure in decision making in the international organ's administrative council, which would guarantee it and its allies total control over all council activities.

Rejecting the mutually acceptable compromises, the American amendments broke all of the agreements that had been reached on the key questions of access to resources, production limits, the functions and structure of the international organ, technology transfer, the revision of the sea bed resource exploitation system, etc. By wrecking the agreements on the sea bed, the United States was forcing the resumption of discussions of other important questions, because they are all part of an interconnected "package" of compromises.

The conference report of the First Committee chairman noted that the publication of the "green paper" attested to the U.S. desire to "prolong the work of the conference for many years." The "Group of 77" refused outright to consider the U.S. "amendments" because they were designed to break the entire convention. In general, they were rejected at the conference by the overwhelming majority of states.

The conference did clarify some convention provisions on the sea bed in line with the wishes of the Western powers and reviewed questions connected with the protection of preliminary capital investments in the exploitation of sea bed resources. The resolution adopted on this matter takes into account the wishes of businessmen in the United States and several Western countries who have already invested capital in preparations for the exploration and exploitation of sea bed resources. It stipulates that "original investor" rights will

be granted to four international consortiums, made up of companies in the United States, England, the FRG and some other Western countries, in addition to government enterprises in the USSR, India, France and Japan. This will give them priority in the acquisition of sections of the ocean floor for prospecting purposes. A contract to work the resources in these sections can be obtained from the international organ only on the condition that the states underwriting the companies and enterprises ratify the convention. The United States was exempted from the fulfillment of this necessary condition (signing the convention) for the status of "original investor." This reflects the desire of developing countries to make concessions to the United States. But even this move by the "Group of 77" was not interpreted correctly in Washington, and the U.S. delegation voted against the convention on 30 April 1982 on the pretext that it would allegedly "inhibit the development" of sea bed resources, not protect U.S. interests, create "serious problems" in the area of technology transfer, etc.

But Reagan's diplomacy failed to sabotage the conference. It is a fact of history that the new maritime legal order was established by the world community in spite of the pressure exerted by Washington. The adoption of the convention signified a major political defeat for the United States, which had hoped to use the LOS example to "teach a lesson" to the entire world.

An article about the Reaganites' "disaster on the high seas" in the 23 August 1982 issue of FORTUNE magazine said: "If the implications were less alarming, all of this would attract attention just because it smacks of farce. The fact is that the United States was one of the main initiators of the LOS treaty. Furthermore, virtually everything the United States wanted is included in the convention provisions. But by deciding not to sign it, it could deprive itself of the advantages being offered. Besides this, the turnabout in the attitude toward this treaty will add fuel to the international reputation of inconsistency and unreliability our country already has."

Nevertheless, Washington officials launched the third stage of their struggle against the convention. American policy following the defeat at the conference was marked by attempts to complicate the conditions of the convention's signing and establish the kind of situation in which the Western countries would be encouraged to bypass the convention in their actual prospecting and working of ocean resources. The struggle went on, and this was attested to, in particular, by an article in the 21 February 1983 issue of the NEW YORK TIMES by E. Meese, counselor to the President, which is filled with attacks on the LOS convention.

On 10 December 1982, however, the convention was signed by 119 countries, including France, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Denmark; in February 1983 it was signed by Japan. England, the FRG, Italy and Belgium have still not reached a final decision.

The Reagan Administration has recently been promoting the idea of a mini-treaty. Its purpose is a separate agreement between the Western countries to sanction the illegal activity of their private companies in the division and seizure of resources in the international sea bed region. This was the

purpose of the agreement on "Provisional Measures Regarding Deep-Sea Polymetallic Concentrations" concluded in Washington not long before the convention was signed, on 2 September 1982. This agreement was declared to be provisional and strictly limited (it was intended to regulate conflicts over deep-sea ocean floor sections between companies of these powers). Three aspects of this agreement attest to its illegality.

First of all, it stipulates that these claims must be submitted before 12 March 1983. The claimant must submit proof of his exploration of the region prior to 28 June 1980 to the arbitration court set up on the basis of the agreement. These arbitrary dates were inconsistent with the decisions of the Third LOS Conference and were directed against other countries interested in the exploitation of sea bed resources (the USSR, Japan, India and others). Secondly, the agreement was based on mutual recognition of the unilateral national legislation of these powers, and not the LOS convention, and allowed for the unlimited submission of claims before the deadline and the apportionment of the most promising sea bed sections to private companies of the four powers. This was contrary to the provisions of the convention and the resolutions of the UN conference, which specified the procedure by which prospecting permits for sea bed sections would be issued by the international organ (preliminary permits will be issued by the preparatory commission until the international organ has been created) and the detailed conditions of this activity, directed against the monopolization of sea bed resources. Thirdly, the agreement was exclusive in nature and established the procedure of mutual consultations by the four powers, obligating them not to enter into any other pacts "incompatible" with this.

This was Washington's move to engineer a separate imperialist conspiracy against the international LOS convention. The United States was not able to establish a mini-order parallel to the convention (the position of France, which signed the convention, is indicative in this respect). As the deputy head of the American delegation at the last, 11th session, L. Ratiner, remarked in reference to Washington's efforts to put together a parallel agreement in an article in the June 1982 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "In any case, our allies will certainly want the mini-treaty to reserve their right to sign the LOS convention. They will do this because the convention sets laws of a higher order than the mini-treaty.... Eventually, allies whose claims to sea bed sections are not recognized by the United States will abandon us as soon as they sign the convention." Ratiner predicted the disgraceful and logical result of the U.S. line against the convention: "We will stand naked like the emperor with no clothes, and the entire world will see that amazing and wonderful things can be done even without American money, leadership and technology."

The U.S. attempts to create a separate mini-treaty were condemned by many states, especially the socialist and developing countries. A declaration of the foreign ministers of the "Group of 77" of 8 October 1982 notes that "any unilateral action or international agreement pertaining to sea bed activity and ignoring the legal provisions in the declaration of sea bed and ocean regulation principles and the standards adopted by the LOS conference, will be invalid from the international standpoint and will lead to measures to protect the interests of all states in the use of this region as the common heritage of mankind."

... report of the new 10% convention by the overwhelming majority of states was reflected in the resolution of the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly, December 1982, for which 135 states voted. The UN General Assembly applauded the adoption of the convention and called upon all states to consider its signing and ratification as quickly as possible in order to secure the effective enactment of the new laws on the use of the sea and its resources. It called upon the governments of all states to refrain from any actions that might undermine the convention.

In a speech at the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly, A. A. Gromyko said: "Many years of effort resulted in a document whose provisions do not restrict anyone's interests. And what happened? The United States is impeding the adoption of this convention. I would like to express the hope that it will stop opposing the vast majority of states party to the convention."

A realistic approach and the reassessment of its current policy on the law of the sea would benefit the United States as much as other countries. It is only on the basis of the convention that it will gain the right to create a 200-mile economic zone and extend its continental shelf beyond the economic zone to the limits stipulated in the convention. The convention provisions about the freedom of shipping, the free passage of all ships and planes through international straits, the limits on the width of territorial waters, the system for the settlement of disputes, the procedure for the organization of maritime research, the measures to prevent the pollution of the sea--these and many other provisions are just as important to the United States as to other countries because it is just as likely as the others to encounter urgent problems in the world ocean that will require mutually acceptable decisions within the framework of the new convention.

American circles connected with international trade, merchant and naval shipping, maritime research and other fields are apparently aware that the continuation of Washington's line against the convention will, in addition to the political failure (the failed attempt to take a stand against the entire world), result in great losses for the United States in various spheres of the use of the ocean expanses and their wealth, including the exploitation of sea bed resources. What is more, the U.S. position could stimulate and strengthen extremist tendencies in some other countries. These circles realize that unilateral national acts outside the convention cannot secure the creation of a 200-mile U.S. economic zone and a continental shelf beyond it, or the other rights specified in the convention, and that the U.S. refusal to observe the convention could allow other countries not to observe its provisions with respect to the United States.

In other words, business circles and specialists realize that the U.S. refusal to sign the convention will put the country outside the international legal order in the world ocean. "If the United States does not become party to this treaty, American treaties will have to go to other countries to have a chance at working the sea bed," L. Ratiner commented in the abovementioned article. As a result, the United States will lose access to strategic crude resources on the ocean floor.... The United States could lose an extremely important war."

Obviously, the convention provisions cannot fully satisfy the United States or the USSR or any other country. After all, this is a compromise and it contains serious obligations as well as rights and requires the fulfillment of necessary conditions. Many U.S. proposals are taken into account in the convention. Naturally, it cannot open the international region and its resources for division and seizure by a handful of Western countries and it cannot allow the international organ to be controlled by any one power, however strong it might be. The convention stipulates the laws regulating the international region and activities in the exploration and exploitation of its resources. It allows all interested countries, which naturally include the United States, to obtain contracts from the international organ for the extraction of these resources in accordance with the convention. The resolution of the LOS conference grants the right of "original investor" to four international consortiums in which the main role is played by U.S. private companies as well as to other interested sides.

But Washington is deeply mistaken if it really regards the convention, as FORTUNE commented, "not as an agreement based on compromise, but as a kind of smorgasbord from which it can choose whatever it likes." Only U.S. participation in the new legal order and its consent to the entire convention "package" will give it international legal grounds to acquire the rights specified in the convention. Otherwise, other states will always have the right not to recognize these rights and to challenge any actions as illegal behavior contrary to the basic goals and principles of the convention.

The convention is not an ordinary pact that can be ignored or boycotted by anyone. It represents a global mutually acceptable resolution to the most urgent world ocean problems in a "package." For the first time, international legal standards will cover all regions of the world ocean and the main spheres of the use of these regions and the exploitation of their resources, animal and mineral. The convention will not injure any state; it takes the legal interests and rights of all countries and groups of states into account. It sets forth their rights and obligations in various regions and spheres of the use of the world ocean on a mutually acceptable basis and defines the maritime borders and limits of national jurisdiction. The convention codifies the principles and standards of contemporary maritime law, making them consistent with the higher requirements and greater potential of human civilization's present level of development.

The legal order established by the convention will be of great value in world economics. It will guarantee the development of world shipping, maritime research, the exploitation of the animal and mineral resources of the seas and oceans and the protection of the seas against pollution and will establish a solid basis for equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation on the seas by all states, regardless of their social and political structure and level of economic development.

But American companies will not receive contracts to work sea bed resources if the United States does not sign the convention. Outside the convention, U.S. business circles will subject their capital to severe risk and this will inhibit their participation in the working of these resources. The convention,

and/or unilateral acts and conflicts, will secure important conditions and stability for the working of sea bed resources, and this, in the final analysis, is more in the interest of U.S. business circles than a risky confrontation with the entire world community.

Therefore, the United States could suffer huge political and economic losses if it adheres to the line directed against the new legal order in the world ocean. Despite America's great strength, it was not able, and will not be able in the future, to disrupt a legal order in the interest of all countries. Of course, the policy of boycotts and violations has created, and will continue to create, difficulties and sizeable obstacles to block the enactment of the convention and the full implementation of its provisions. This must be considered, but it is already clear that the convention will be ratified by at least 60 states within the near future and it will go into force. This is the wish of the overwhelming majority of countries--states belonging to different socioeconomic systems. No boycott of the convention can prevent this.

The work of the preparatory commission for the international organ on the sea bed, which began in March, should be an important stage in the implementation of convention provisions. Its members represent the states which have signed the convention. Countries which signed only the final act of the conference, such as the United States, can only observe and do not have the right to participate in decision making. Here again, Washington has put itself in an unfavorable position by refusing to sign the convention because it has lost the right to vote on extremely important matters in the commission.

At its first session the preparatory commission must first decide and adopt its rules of order. According to the conference resolution, it should implement the conference's own rules of order. The reference is not coincidental and it stipulated the use of the tried and tested method of the consensus as the chief method of agreement and the approval of decisions on all important matters. In addition to adopting the rules of order, the preparatory commission must draft an agenda and rules of order for the first sessions of the international organ's assembly and council, recommendations on the budget for the first financial period and plans for the working secretariat, etc. The most important and time-consuming task of the preparatory commission will consist in drafting the standards, rules and procedures needed for the performance of the international organ's functions. These draft rules will be of great practical value and will apply to the prospecting and working of sea bed resources. Business circles in the United States have displayed considerable interest in these standards and rules.

The second conference resolution assigned the preparatory commission important operational functions connected with the examination of the claims of "original investors," including the four international consortiums whose members include American companies. The commission will decide whether the provisions of the convention and the second resolution are being observed in each specific case and, on the basis of this, will approve claims for registration as an "original investor." These investors will have the exclusive right to conduct initial sea bed operations for the subsequent attainment of resource exploitation contracts from the international organ.

The laws stipulated in the convention have already gone into effect, despite the fact that the official enactment of the convention has not taken place. This is attested to not only by the work of the preparatory commission, but also by the process that has begun to bring the national legislation and maritime practices of various countries in line with the convention, and the support of the convention by the overwhelming majority of states.

The legal provisions set forth in the LOS convention reflect the collective wishes of the world community and states of different socioeconomic systems and will help to strengthen peace and international cooperation.

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U.S. SEEN AIDING S. AFRICA IN NAMIBIA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 83 (signed to press 18 Mar 83) pp 49-52

[Article by V. Yu. Vasil'kov: "The Problem of Namibia and the U.S. Position"]

[Text] Due to endless delays in the implementation of Resolution 435 of the UN Security Council on Namibia* on the part of Western powers, especially the United States, the territory of this country is still being occupied by South African troops.

Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar of the United Nations, who toured southern Africa in February, asked the international community to take decisive steps to secure Namibia's quickest possible transition to independence. He pointedly criticized the aggressive policy of South Africa and the actions of the United States, which had tried to "link" the granting of independence

* Namibia, the former colony of South-West Africa (SWA), which was occupied by troops of the Union of South Africa (the Republic of South Africa since 1961) in 1915, was surrendered to South Africa under a League of Nations mandate in 1920. After World War II the Union of South Africa refused to accept the UN decision on the inclusion of SWA in the international trusteeship system and annexed the territory in 1949, turning it into one of its provinces.

Since 1958 the struggle of the native population for freedom and independence has been headed by the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), recognized by the United Nations and OAS as the only legitimate representative of this population.

In 1966 the UN General Assembly divested South Africa of its administration rights in SWA and created the UN Council for South-West Africa (renamed Namibia in 1968), thereby taking the administration of the territory into its own hands. The resistance of South Africa, with the approval of Western countries, has actually kept the council from performing its duties.

In 1978 the UN Security Council adopted a peace plan (Resolution 435), envisaging UN-supervised free elections in Namibia and the granting of independence to this territory. But South Africa rejected the plan and took steps toward an "internal settlement"--a conspiracy involving a puppet government without SWAPO participation.

to Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. "Their presence," he said, "is a matter of bilateral relations between Angola and Cuba. We must take action on the basis of Resolution 435 of the UN Security Council."

The aggressive policy of South Africa, which violates international law, UN decisions and the Namibian people's legitimate desire for freedom and independence, became particularly flagrant when the Reagan Administration took charge in the United States in 1981. In this administration the South African racists found support and frank approval. The United States, which is a member of the so-called "contact group" on Namibia, created by it along with England, the FRG, France and Canada in 1977 as a mediator in the settlement of the Namibian problem, put forth a new settlement formula in summer 1981 by "linking" the resolution of this problem with the withdrawal from Angola of the contingent of Cuban troops invited there by the Angolan Government for defense against the South African aggressors.

Washington declared South Africa a strategic ally of the United States and actually took steps to undermine the UN plan. In 1981 the American representative in the Security Council vetoed resolutions on sanctions against South Africa and on the condemnation of South African aggression against Angola. American diplomacy simultaneously started arguing the voting procedure in the planned elections in Namibia and then reduced the entire Namibian problem to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

This "linkage" was fully satisfactory to the South African racists. The majority of African countries, SWAPO and even the United States' partners in the "contact group," however, called this plan unrealistic and provocative, said that it encouraged aggressive behavior and predicted that it would actually wreck the UN plan for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem. SWAPO asked the people to intensify their struggle against the occupation forces. As a result of the military operations of patriots, a published SWAPO communique reported that its zone of combat encompassed almost half of Namibia by the end of 1982.

The South African racists and their patrons were alarmed by this. The fall of 1982 was marked by feverish U.S. diplomatic activity with regard to the Namibian problem. Director W. Casey of the CIA visited South Africa. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs C. Crocker traveled to the capitals of the four countries belonging to the "contact group," and W. Clark, the President's national security assistant, went to Paris for talks on Namibia with French President F. Mitterand. Vice-President G. Bush, accompanied by C. Crocker and Assistant Secretary of State E. Abrams, toured seven African countries, visiting the Republic of Cape Verde, Senegal, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Zaire; C. Crocker and E. Abrams later went to Pretoria. This round of activity concluded with the talks by South African Foreign Minister R. Botha with Secretary of State G. Shultz and his Under Secretary L. Eagleburger in Washington on 26-30 November 1982.

Therefore, the extremely solid forces of American diplomacy were pitted against Namibia. What were the results?

Before G. Bush left Washington for his tour of Africa, he announced that a settlement in Namibia would be impossible without the removal of Cuban troops from Angola--that is, he reaffirmed the "linkage" principle or "parallel" resolution of the Namibian crisis. It is clear that the purpose did not consist so much in informing the African leaders of the U.S. position or in learning their opinions--both were already known--as in exerting pressure on the African countries and imposing the American "linkage" concept on them.

"He came, he saw, but he did not conquer"--this is how Zimbabwe's SUNDAY MAIL summarized the efforts made by the American emissary. The entire African press described his diplomacy as "blackmail" and "trickery." The heads of the countries he visited resolutely rejected Washington's proposals. The leaders of Kenya, for example, categorically declared that the attempts to describe both the South African occupation troops in Namibia and the Cuban volunteers in Angola as "foreign troops on alien territory" and to demand their "parallel" removal on this basis was neither legally valid nor convincing and represented another attempt to postpone the granting of independence to Namibia.

The African countries' position was fully supported by the international community, and this was clearly reflected in the resolution of the special session of the UN General Assembly on Namibia in September 1981. Reaffirming SWAPO's status as the "only legitimate representative of the Namibian people," the General Assembly called upon all of the UN states to give it and the "front-line states" greater and constant support and material, financial, military and other assistance to strengthen their fight for liberation. South Africa and its Western patrons were resolutely condemned in the resolution for delaying the settlement, blocking the UN Security Council actions in this direction and trying to undermine Security Council Resolution 435, which was still "the only basis for settlement." The resolution also contained an appeal for all-encompassing sanctions against South Africa in accordance with Article VII of the UN Charter.

An emergency session of the UN Council on Namibia, held in May 1982 in Tanzania, also condemned the West's neocolonial plans for Namibia. In this way, the actions of SWAPO and the assistance it had received from African and socialist countries won the full support of prestigious international organs. On 23 November 1982, on the day that G. Bush left Africa, an editorial in the NAIROBI TIMES summed up the African countries' reactions to this trip, commenting that "the American view of the key problem of Namibian independence was so diametrically opposed to the viewpoint of the African officials who received Bush that one wonders whether it was worth his while to take this exhausting trip to Africa in order to express this view." The ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL stressed that free Africa could not consent to imaginary Namibian independence and the threat of Angola's colonization.

South Africa has been waging an undeclared war against Angola for a long time and, according to UN data, it caused material damages in Angola estimated at 7 billion dollars just between 1975 and 1980. In 1981 the South African racists occupied part of Angola and have been supporting the anti-people separatist UNITA group. Under these conditions, Cuba's internationalist

assistance is promoting stability in the region, strengthening the legal Angolan Government (Incidentally, J. Carter acknowledged this when he was President) and helping it ward off further aggression, which obviously does not pose any threat to South African security.

To win support for the "linkage" plan in the outside world, a rumor was spread about possible American safeguards for Angola after the removal of the Cuban troops. The Western press took up this story and heated debates broke out. But everyone recalls the September events of last year in Lebanon, where the "American safeguards" did not prevent the bloody massacre staged by Israel and did not guarantee the withdrawal of the invading Israeli army from the country after the Palestinian forces had left. This naturally suggests that the demands for the "parallel withdrawal of troops" conceal a U.S. plan to leave Angola helpless in the face of South African aggression. After South Africa's "departure" from Namibia, some South African troops and foreign mercenaries could remain there to support antigovernment UNITA gangs and stage subversive actions against Angola. The example of Mozambique should be taken as a warning. There are no Cuban troops there, but it has nevertheless been subjected to regular armed invasions by South Africa and its ward, the antigovernment PDU. Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho have also been targets of aggression by the South African racists more than once. It was precisely with a view to this experience that President S. Nujoma of SWAPO openly accused the West of preparing "another Lebanon" in Namibia and Angola.

The analogy with Lebanon is also suggested by R. Botha's statement in Washington about South Africa's willingness to withdraw its troops from Namibia after UN peacekeeping forces had arrived, on the condition that Cuban troops be removed from Angola. Everyone knows, however, that the multinational UN force in Lebanon, consisting of troops from the Western countries, including American troops, allowed Israeli forces to enter the Palestinian camps unimpeded.

Washington's acceptance, and even encouragement, of aggression proved that the United States is not the "catalyst of peace" in Namibia, as Vice-President G. Bush asserted, but that it is, on the contrary, helping South Africa take a tougher stand. Although the position of the racist regime could never have been called constructive even in the past, now the extremely favorable attitude of the Reagan Administration has caused it to completely lose touch with reality.

The open cooperation of the United States with the South African racists, which is justified, as the WASHINGTON POST admitted on 20 October 1982, with the "totally absurd premise that indulging the Pretoria regime could motivate South Africa to relax its racist policy and grant Namibia independence," has actually made "South Africa's military raids on neighboring territory even more brazen, and the policy of racial suppression even more brutal."

If we examine Washington's approach to the Namibian question in the broader context of the state of affairs in all southern Africa, it is clear that the current U.S. administration has "simplified" the problem of south African settlement by confining it to Namibia alone, but has also complicated it with

the addition of the artificially created "Angola problem." This diplomatic maneuver reflected a change in the U.S. approach to southern Africa: It has been raised from the regional to the global level (previous administrations regarded apartheid in South Africa as the main reason for the permanent state of unrest in the region), and South Africa, despite its preservation of apartheid, has become Washington's strategic ally while the Angolan revolution has become its chief opponent.

It is completely obvious, therefore, that the feverish American diplomatic activity over the Namibian problem and the series of visits and talks by high-level U.S. and South African officials were all supposed to distract the African and world public from the real purpose of Washington's participation in the resolution of the Namibian problem: to stifle the Angolan revolution and restore the pro-Western status quo in the region with nominal settlement in Namibia.

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REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TRIES TO LIMIT CIVIL, POLITICAL RIGHTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 83 (signed to press 18 Mar 83) pp 53-55

[Article by A. G. Tikhonova: "A New Attack on Civil Liberties"]

[Text] The imperial nature of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy and Washington's militarist ambitions in the international arena have naturally been accompanied, as they have in the past, by a tendency toward stronger reaction and toward an attack on the American people's democratic gains.

The neoconservatives behind the wheel of government are convinced that there is "too much freedom" and dissent in the United States. In their opinion, what the American people need most right now is the "severe scolding" once prescribed by former Vice-President Spiro Agnew (who was discovered to have engaged in financial intrigues). These neoconservative ideas have not remained on paper; energetic attempts have been made to turn them into concrete political practices.

A new campaign to eradicate gains in the area of civil rights and liberties, achieved by the American people over decades of persistent struggle, is being launched under the slogans of a fight for "law and order" and in the name of the "efficient and stable functioning of society."

Further measures to reinforce the machinery of repression were an essential condition of the campaign. These measures included an executive order signed by Ronald Reagan at the end of 1981 to give special services much broader powers to collect information both abroad and inside the country. The FBI and even the CIA were officially authorized to conduct secret operations in the country, to plant agents in public and other organizations and to engage in "special (!) activity" with regard to international organizations headquartered in the United States. The order authorized the surveillance of American citizens abroad and granted the Justice Department the right to authorize the extensive use of methods, which previously could be employed only in extraordinary cases and in accordance with a special warrant, for intelligence purposes within the United States or against any American citizen abroad. It also presupposed the active use of informants, figure-heads and dummy organizations.*

* For more about the U.S. administration policy of augmenting the powers of the so-called intelligence community, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1980, No 8, pp 74-77--Editor's note.

According to F. Chapman, a spokesman for a national union of struggle against racial and political repression, this order legalizes espionage and the infiltration of progressive organizations by informants. It is completely obvious that the prime target of this offensive will be communists, organizations for the protection of civil rights and liberties and participants in protest movements against the government's militarist policy and for arms reduction. They can now be prosecuted simply on the suspicion that these organizations "might be acting on the orders of a foreign power"; the anticommunist, anti-Soviet purpose of these measures is not even being concealed. As Chapman remarked, the order is supposed to "unchain the FBI and CIA and create a political police force to stifle dissent and smash progressive movements in our country."

The recent law passed on the nondisclosure of the names of special service agents by the media, defining the exposure of secret FBI and CIA agents in the press as a crime, evoked debates in the American press. This law contradicts the U.S. constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from passing laws limiting freedom of speech and the press. And of course, this is not just a matter of names: In general, the law permits the concealment of information about illegal activities by special services from the public.

Another of the President's executive orders introduces new criteria for the classification of government documents. This shows how much trouble the administration is taking to conceal information about its own activities. The White House efforts to conceal this information from the public are not surprising: The less people know, the easier it is to shape their opinions. The campaign to exclude the special services from the jurisdiction of the 1966 Freedom of Information Act was the next logical step. On the basis of a 1974 amendment to this act, in the mid-1970's the American public received access to information about constitutional violations in the country by the intelligence community and by members of the upper echelon of government.

The first step in the eradication of the freedom of information act was a Department of Justice memorandum of 4 May 1981, in accordance with which the access to this information was sharply restricted. Bills designed to revise the provisions of the act are now being discussed in both houses of Congress. A nationwide protest campaign has been launched in response to these measures. This was the first item on the agenda at an American writers' convention in October 1981. The convention resolution stressed: "The attempts of the executive and legislative branches to weaken the Freedom of Information Act, to ignore and to exclude intelligence bodies and other federal agencies from its sphere of jurisdiction all testify to deliberate efforts to restrict freedom of information."

Another step in the reinforcement of the repressive system was the creation of the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, headed by Senator J. Denton from Alabama, known for his reactionary views. The founders of this congressional body planned to "investigate the activities of the communist party and a large group of leftist radical organizations and other American public organizations whose members and leaders have sympathized at some time with Vietnam and Cuba or opposed the nuclear arms buildup and the increase in

allocations for the arms race. During only the second set of hearings before the subcommittee, someone frankly said that dissent in the country is supposedly caused by the misinformation that is being spread by "agents from the USSR." Recently the subcommittee began investigating "the infiltration of the American press and private organizations by Soviet agents." The public views this as an attempt to revive the old "witch-hunt instrument"--the notorious Un-American Activities Committee. The new Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism has already been aptly called the "congressional inquisition" by the press.

The American public is also worried about the administration's proposed reform of criminal law. All attempts to push a criminal code reform bill through the Congress in the last 6 years have failed. This is the result of active resistance by democratic circles. The broadest opposition base has been created by labor unions, as the bill would limit the rights of their members. For example, picketing and other forms of union activity aimed against management during strikes would be categorized as crimes. Strikes by unorganized labor would also justify repressive court orders. The bill validates the prosecution of participants in antiwar rallies and demonstrations and classifies the disruption of court proceedings by "loud" and "restless" behavior as a federal crime. This, in turn, paves the way for lawlessness and brutality.

The political and social climate in the United States today, according to several politicians, is similar to the atmosphere in the Weimar Republic before the arrival of the Nazis. Concerned Americans have warned that the threat of fascism in the United States is quite real. The increased activity of reactionary forces is being stimulated by the decline of trust in democratic institutions and values, which became more pronounced after the Watergate scandal, and by mounting chauvinist feelings.

The institution of stronger censorship in the United States is an alarming symptom. Several classics of American literature are being removed from libraries and schools.

All of this has evoked the justifiable concern of democratic groups in the country. The fate of civil rights is again the center of attention for the progressive public. In a recently published report by the American Civil Liberties Union, the authors analyze the Reagan Administration's activity in this sphere and conclude that civil liberties are in real danger now that the government is acting against the cardinal legal and political principles on which the U.S. Constitution is founded. The administration has launched an attack on the entire constitutional system, the report says, and the prime target is the Bill of Rights.

The report expressly states that the greatest threat to civil liberties is posed less by individual reactionary groups or organizations like the Moral Majority than by "the administration itself and its allies in the Congress."

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BOOK ON U.S. LATIN AMERICA POLICY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 83 (signed to press 18 Mar 83) p 105

[Review by G. T. Malyutin of book "Politika SShA v Latinskoy Amerike. 1918-1928" [U.S. Policy in Latin America. 1918-1928] by I. I. Yanchuk, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 344 pages]

[Text] This book covers the period after World War I, when the system of U.S. imperialist domination took shape in the Caribbean and hundreds of millions of American dollars, earned in the war, were sent into South America. It was at this time that the workers and national liberation movements in Latin America gained strength under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The author describes the basic directions of U.S. foreign economic expansion in the 1920's and examines various aspects of the State Department's interaction with U.S. monopolies during the course of this expansion. His analysis provides a clearer understanding of the reasons for the current deformed structure of the Latin American economies, which are doomed to serve U.S. monopolies as suppliers of raw materials. The degree and form of Latin American dependence on the United States at that time stemmed from their colonial type of relationship. The United States created enclaves of mining enterprises, oil-fields and plantations which did not contribute to the balanced economic development of Latin America but simply augmented the profits of American monopolists.

With the aid of local conservative and reactionary elements, the American monopolies seized the most valuable resource in Latin America--its oil--and "pumped out" colossal profits along with the oil. At the end of the 1920's Latin Americans became more aware of the ruinous implications of foreign capital's domination of the oil industry and attempts were made to protect oil resources against unrestricted theft by American monopolies in Colombia, Venezuela and Argentina. American oil monopolies encountered the most stubborn resistance in Mexico.

The heroic resistance of American occupation forces in Nicaragua by the partisan detachments led by Augusto Sandino was a vivid example of the national

liberation struggle of that time. A special chapter deals with these unforgettable pages of Latin American history (pp 247-317).

L. I. Yurchuk has given considerable attention to the analysis of the ideological and American imperialist expansion and criticism of American bourgeois historical research.

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BOOK ON NATO POLICY TOWARD CYPRUS REVIEWED

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[Review by V. I. Danilov of book "Kipr v sredizemnomorskoy politike NATO" [Cyprus in NATO Mediterranean Policy] by V. A. Shmarov, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 248 pages]

[Text] This new book deals with matters that have concerned the entire world public for a long time. They are the group of acute historical and political problems in the current system of international relations in the East Mediterranean. The independent Republic of Cyprus is the epicenter of these events and the imperialist policy of the United States and of NATO in general is the main generator of tension.

The United States has displayed particular interest in the Cyprus question for two reasons: its strategic aims in this region and the simultaneous involvement of two NATO members--Greece and Turkey--in the conflict. Besides this, Cyprus is not far from the oil suppliers in the region declared a "zone of vital U.S. interests" by Washington.

The author examines the policy of the United States and NATO in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle from the 1960's on--that is, after the declaration of Cyprus' independence. The author describes the workings of U.S. and NATO policy toward Cyprus and the methods Washington used to interfere in its internal affairs on the basis of the Zurich and London agreements imposed on Cyprus by the British colonizers in 1959.

Analyzing the neocolonial essence of these agreements, the author uses the events of 1974 to show how these agreements were used by Washington and NATO to exacerbate conflicts between Greece and Turkey. Officially, the United States stayed out of the conflict, walking a tightrope between the interests of its battling NATO "junior partners." The method of "crisis management" employed by American diplomacy in this case allowed the United States to take advantage of the Greco-Turkish conflicts over Cyprus to keep these countries in the orbit of Atlantic policy and "let some steam out of the kettle" each time these conflicts reached the critical point and threatened the collapse of NATO's southeastern flank.

The United States has been able to pursue its own military and political interests in the East Mediterranean. For example, it is the English bases on Cyprus which serve the United States as a channel of direct supply to Israel. It is from here that the United States makes reconnaissance flights over countries in the Near and Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The policy of the United States does not take the legitimate interests of Greece and Turkey into account, the author notes. For this reason, this policy and this diplomacy will eventually be quite damaging. This is attested to by Greece's withdrawal from the NATO military organization and Turkey's threats to establish national control over NATO bases on its territory.

V. A. Shmarov notes that the interests of two "power centers"--the United States and Western Europe--have clashed over the Cyprus issue, and this is giving rise to serious friction between them (p 7). The author's conclusion that the Cyprus conflict will therefore "add to the severity of the already severe military and political crisis in NATO" (p 124) is quite interesting and timely. Western Europe, he stresses, has repeatedly dissociated itself from U.S. policy and taken a different stand on problems in the East Mediterranean (p 126). In spite of this, however, the United States intends to continue using Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to secure its own interests in the Mediterranean.

Two factors--Cyprus' heightened significance as a military-strategic bridgehead and the need to neutralize Greco-Turkish conflicts--have forced the United States to seek new approaches to the Cyprus problem. The author's conclusion that U.S. diplomacy might work toward a revision of the Zurich-London agreements, to make the United States one of the guarantor countries with the right to intervene directly in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, is interesting in this connection (p 152).

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EMERGENCY POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

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[Article by V. A. Vlasikhin and T. Z. Dzhaparidze]

[Text] Legislation and political practices in the United States testify that the U.S. President has emergency punitive powers. It is important to note that the President's power to declare a state of emergency--whether military, police or economic--has no direct constitutional basis. Presidents have tried to substantiate this power by saying that Article II of the Constitution implies that this is an inalienable right by assigning the chief executive the functions of commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the militia (National Guard) of the states and the obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." They also say that Article IV obligates the federal government to guarantee every state in the union a form of government and--at the request of the states--protect the states against "invasion or domestic violence."

In U.S. history this "implied" constitutional mandate has been stated more specifically by the Congress in legislation, by the courts in standard decisions and by presidents in administrative acts and actions which often are not even supported by court orders. The gradual delegation of powers not directly specified in the Constitution to the President has led, as American researcher F. Cronin notes, to the excessive "swelling" of presidential authority and the augmentation of the President's emergency powers.¹ In 1976 a special Senate committee reported on how far the delegation of emergency powers had gone and stated that related statutes "cover each aspect of American life."² The special committee found around 470 statutes the President could use as grounds for the declaration of a state of emergency, either nationwide or in specific spheres of societal functioning--economic, military-political, labor relations, public order and justice.³

However, the question of the grounds for the declaration of a state of emergency by the President and the nature of the emergency measures he can take are quite vague in American jurisprudence (whose adherents regard it as a "fine point" of legal technique). As the previously mentioned report states, "no one has ever adhered to any kind of consistent or definite procedure in declaring, exercising and suspending a nationwide state of emergency."⁴ In

... the Law does not specify any standard criteria of the very concept of the "state of emergency," but merely refers to it as the kind of extreme situation in which the President must exercise special emergency powers.² As a result, Congress has left the specific circumstances and volume of these powers to the chief executive's own discretion.

The American President has quite extensive emergency powers in economics. At times of economic or financial crisis, international tension or a state of war, the administration can temporarily put whole branches of the economy under the strictest governmental control. This kind of control is contrary, in principle, to the capitalist ideals of "free enterprise," but, as prominent American expert on governmental affairs R. Carr wrote, the President bears "unlimited responsibility to save the United States of America. When the nation is threatened by destruction, even the most cherished beliefs and traditions can be surrendered for the sake of salvation."⁶

Strikes can serve as grounds for this kind of control. The President can be empowered by Congress, for example, to put striking enterprises (in industry, transportation, communications and defense) under government control for as long as necessary by making the directors or owners of these enterprises official representatives of the government and mobilizing all of the workers for military service. On the basis of his own executive orders, the President can create administrative bodies to manage the economy and penalize individuals and enterprises acting in violation of his instructions.

An international situation can be another cause. The Act on International Emergency Powers⁷ obligates the chief executive to declare a state of emergency in the event of an "extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States" (an outside threat). According to this act, the President has the power to regulate or cancel currency operations with foreign states and issue orders to attach their property. In the event of a state of war, in accordance with the Act on Trade with the Enemy,⁸ the White House head has the right to regulate or prohibit the purchase or sale of property of "security value to the country," regardless of whether it is located inside or outside the United States.

The Act on the Media⁹ presupposes the use of radio and television by the President for the needs of government agencies in the event of a "state of war, threat of war or a threat to national security due to internal disorder."

Finally, the laws on emergency powers can be executed even without any particular grounds; for example, they can be based on some kind of archaic provisions that have never been formally repealed. Presidents have often used powers once delegated to them by the Congress and never repealed notwithstanding common sense. For example, in the last century, during the Civil War, Congress passed the Forage Act, which empowered cavalry units to buy fodder without the consent of Congress when it was in recess. Later, the White House used this provision to spend millions of dollars without congressional consent on military operations in Lebanon in 1958, the Berlin Crisis in 1961 and the support of military operations in Southeast Asia.¹⁰

By 1933, limiting banking operations allowed the President to take control of many economic functions which had previously been a congressional prerogative. On the basis of this statute, the chief executive has often used his own discretion in the arbitrary regulation of various aspects of foreign trade and international currency operations.

In 1950, at the time of the U.S. intervention in Korea, a law was passed on defense-related manufactured goods, empowering the President to control manufacturing output for "national defense purposes." Sixteen years later, the Department of Defense cited this law when it sent U.S. troops in Vietnam 3 million uniforms.

The President has extensive discretionary authority to use military force for punitive purposes within the country whenever he feels that this is warranted.

For example, §331, ch 15, t 10 of the U.S. Code stipulates that in the event of an uprising in any state, "directed against the government of this state," the President can exercise his constitutional prerogatives (Article IV) and, at the request of the legislature or governor, use the National Guard and regular troops "in the numbers and within the limits he deems necessary to suppress the uprising." And §332 secures the President's extraconstitutional right to use the National Guard and regular troops on the territory of any state, without the request of the state authorities, if he feels that "illegal associations" are being created in the state to block the functioning of government and the execution of laws, when "illegal associations" are created and become active or when rebellions against the federal government break out. In the same case as well, military force is used by the President within the limits "he deems necessary" for the restoration of order.

Furthermore, §333 stipulates that the President, "using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or ANY OTHER MEANS (emphasis ours--Author), will take the measures he deems necessary to suppress riots, domestic violence, illegal associations or conspiracies in any state" if these prevent the execution of the laws of the United States or obstruct justice.

In addition, §3500 and 8500 of t 10 secure the President's right to call out the National Guard for active federal service and use it within the necessary limits in the event of a rebellion or threatened rebellion against the government or if the authorities should be unable to execute laws of the United States by "conventional means."¹¹

Presidents have exercised just these powers nine times since World War II. Five times this was done on the basis of executive orders or directives to suppress or prevent racial tension. In four cases presidents used troops and the National Guard at the request of state governors to suppress mass unrest and protest demonstrations.¹²

The constitution stipulates (Article I, Section 9) that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus can be suspended in cases of "rebellion or invasion" in the interest of public security. The essence of the procedure called habeas corpus is that any citizen who is arrested has the right to demand an

immediate court hearing from the detaining authority to check the legality, validity and accuracy of the warrant. The constitution does not state expressly whether the right to suspend this privilege is granted to the Congress or the President.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended for the first time by President A. Lincoln on the basis of his own executive order at the beginning of the Civil War of 1861-1865, although this action displeased many people¹³ and Lincoln had to gain the support of the Congress, which passed a special law (on 3 March 1863). The privilege was later suspended by the executive branch three times (in South Carolina in 1871 in a struggle against Ku Klux Klan gangs, in the Philippines in 1905 for the suppression of a national liberation movement there, and in Hawaii in 1941-1944 during World War II), but in every case this was done on the basis of the appropriate legislative act.

Therefore, U.S. constitutional practice testifies that the President has the right, with congressional approval, to secure public safety by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus when individuals take actions against the government or against the interests of U.S. "military and state security." In practical terms, this means that the conventional detention procedures do not extend to these people, and their cases are taken out of the jurisdiction of conventional courts (with juries and procedural guarantees) and are turned over to military courts or military commissions for a summary trial.

According to §1383 of t 18, the President has the authority to declare any part of the United States or all of it a "zone of war." People living within this zone can be subjected to loss of liberty for up to 1 year for failing to comply with any executive order.

In a state of war, the President can order the internment of foreigners and U.S. citizens who pose a "potential threat" to the state. For example, on 19 February 1942 President F. Roosevelt issued an executive order (No 9066) in which he cited the authority granted him "as the President of the United States and the commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy" and ordered military commanders to declare certain parts of the country restricted for habitation by "any individuals" (at the discretion of the military command) and to intern individuals in order to prevent espionage, sabotage and diversionary and subversive activity. In execution of this order, more than 112,000 people of Japanese origin (more than two-thirds of whom were American citizens) were expelled from the states on the West Coast and confined in camps and "relocation centers" in the nation's central regions. This unprecedented action, as Soviet jurist V. A. Kovalev has pointed out, was directed primarily against American citizens: "The Constitution of the United States, which categorically prohibits unreasonable seizures (Amendment IV), covered each of them, regardless of origin. But it is precisely the absence of any legal grounds that distinguishes this action. The American citizens who were arrested and subjected to preventive confinement had not committed any crime and no charges were brought against them. These arrests cannot be described as anything other than flagrant disregard for the constitutional principle of the inviolability of the individual."¹⁴

Nevertheless, Congress supported the President's action with a special law on March 21, 1942, and the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of the President's executive order and Congress' legislative act.¹⁵

The cessation of military operations and the related suspension of the state of war do not divest the President of the right to exercise his emergency powers. For example, on 31 December 1946 President H. Truman announced the end of the war (Presidential Declaration 2714) and in July 1947 both houses of Congress adopted a joint resolution on the repeal of the majority of wartime laws; Truman signed this resolution but he stipulated that "international tension" dictated the retention of his military and emergency powers.¹⁶ During the cold war, which was started by Western imperialist circles, the U.S. administration needed to make references to "international tension" in order to prepare the "legal" soil for an attack on democratic forces within the country on the pretext of an "outside threat."

The 1950 Internal Security Act (the McCarran-Wood Act), banning the Communist Party U.S.A. as a "subversive" organization and restricting the constitutional rights of communists, was passed on the wave of anticommunist hysteria and in the spirit of McCarthyism. Among other things, this law gave the President the right to declare "a state of emergency in the area of internal security" and empowered the Department of Justice (if this declaration should be made) to practice extralegal repression and to put any people suspected of "subversive" activity under guard or confine them in concentration camps as a preventive measure.¹⁷ Several camps were set up in the United States for this purpose.

At the beginning of the U.S. intervention in Korea, a law was passed in 1950 on defense-related production, restoring the President's emergency powers with regard to economic operations. Acting on this basis, Truman "confiscated" steel companies where workers went on strike, but the Supreme Court ruled that this action was unconstitutional (in view of the changing foreign policy situation).¹⁸ However, precedents in presidential practices of the late 1940's suggest that Congress and the President (or the President alone on the basis of an executive order) could authorize the institution of more resolute emergency measures within the country in the event of the abrupt escalation of international tension or the start of a military conflict abroad involving U.S. armed forces.

Measures connected with the execution of emergency powers that had not been canceled during the last four decades were finally canceled in 1976 when an act on nationwide emergency powers was passed.¹⁹ This act stipulated that the declaration of a state of emergency was contingent upon congressional consent. But the process by which the chief executive's emergency powers were compounded and amplified never stopped. Their subsequent delegation to various subdivisions of the executive branch and the establishment of a special mechanism to coordinate the activities of government agencies in a state of emergency are recorded in Executive Order 11490 of 1969; it was later supplemented and amended by Executive Order 12148 of 1979 and Presidential Memorandum 32.²⁰ These documents specify the duties and powers delegated to various links of the administration and the heads of these links by the chief executive.

The provisions of these executive orders go into force after Congress passes the appropriate act on their execution.

According to Executive Order 11490, government agencies are obligated to function according to the emergency readiness plan when a state of emergency is declared.

The secretary of the treasury, for example, must oversee U.S. participation in bilateral and multilateral financial negotiations; take action to stabilize the finance and credit system and the exchange rate of the dollar in relation to foreign currencies; guarantee the functioning of banks and the safety of operations with government securities; strictly regulate the transference of overseas assets in conjunction with the Department of Commerce; institute stricter control over the issuance of securities and money and the activities of customs and tax agencies.

The Department of Commerce must draw up programs for the production and distribution of all goods and the use of all production capacities (with the exception of those under the control of the Defense Department); it must also oversee the production and distribution of funds used in the attainment of oil, gas, electrical power and hard fuel, the production, distribution and storage of the products of the food industry, the production of components used in the defense industry, the construction and use of highways and streets and the operation of residential and commercial buildings and civilian ports; it must oversee national exports and imports and regulate them in the interest of state security.

The Department of Transportation must establish strict control over all means of transport--air, land and water--and passenger and freight traffic on all types of vehicles.

The Department of the Interior must oversee the production of electricity and the extraction of oil, gas and minerals of strategic value.

The administration of the U.S. Export-Import Bank must draw up a plan to guarantee the use of all its financial resources to heighten the effectiveness of transactions abroad in the purchase of necessary materials.

The Interstate Commerce Commission, working in conjunction with the Department of Transportation, must draw up a plan for the use of railway, motor and water transport and reduce their vulnerability in the event of a state of emergency.

In reference to the extensive potential and actual emergency powers of the President within the country, American political scientist G. Caldwell calls the chief executive "a kind of constitutional dictator."²¹

It must be said that the President can even use military force for punitive purposes within the United States without declaring a state of emergency, on the strength of his constitutional obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."²²

at the end of the last century, the federal government had already instituted the use of a method for the suppression of, for example, labor strikes with the aid of court orders which declare the strikes to be "illegal conspiracies," supposedly aimed at the restriction of "interstate commerce" or "preventing" the performance of a governmental function; the failure of workers to observe a court order to stop a strike gives the Department of Justice grounds to take coercive action with the aid of federal bailiffs (called U.S. marshals), and resistance in these cases is used as grounds to call out regular troops. Since that time, federal troops and militarized subunits of the Department of Justice's U.S. Marshals Service have been used several times against striking workers. In 1971 a special tactical force was organized as part of this service to be mobilized on the orders of the head of the Department of Justice "in national emergencies" when local police resources are inadequate and the use of the National Guard and regular troops is "unwarranted."²³

The special tactical force is a highly mobile and militarized "elite" subunit. It can be alerted at any time of the day or night and can be transferred to any part of the continental United States within 6 hours. The members of this force are carefully selected volunteers from among the U.S. marshals. They undergo special training for the performance of particularly complex operations, combining the skills of police work with army field training. In the last decade the force has been used several times by the federal government against striking workers and in the suppression of protest demonstrations by farmers and mass unrest in various parts of the country. The force conducts its operations according to all the laws of military tactics, using army equipment and special police equipment. The specific capabilities of this little-publicized force allow the administration and the President to use military force for punitive purposes, camouflaging these repressive measures as "police actions" to establish order. In this way, the President avoids the excessive political publicity connected with the official declaration and execution of emergency punitive powers.

FOOTNOTES

1. T. Cronin, "The State of the Presidency," Boston, 1975, p 8.
2. "National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers. Final Report of the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers. U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2d Session," Wash., 1976, p 14.
3. Ibid., p 5.
4. Ibid., p 4.
5. The President has been delegated at least 200 extraconstitutional powers since the beginning of American history (ibid., p 2).
6. Quoted by: A. A. Mishin, "Gosudarstvennoye pravo SShA" [Administrative Law of the United States], Moscow, 1976, p 172.

7. 50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq.
8. 50 U.S.C. app. §5.
9. 47 U.S.C. §606(c).
10. "National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers," pp 12-13.
11. The National Guard is an organized and combat-ready first-line defense reserve which immediately passes under the full jurisdiction of the Army and Air Force command when a state of emergency is declared. The army units of the National Guard alone account for 28 percent of the medium tanks, 31 percent of the planes and helicopters, 35 percent of the artillery and 33 percent of the armored personnel carriers in the combat equipment of regular troops (ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 1981, No 1, pp 8-9).
12. "The Constitution of the United States of America. Analysis and Interpretation," Wash., 1973, p 473. The punitive potential of the National Guard is used much more frequently by the heads of the executive branch in the states--the governors. In the 1960's and 1970's they called out the National Guard numerous times to take action against participants in political protest demonstrations. For example, on 4 May 1970 National Guardsmen opened fire on student demonstrators at Kent State University (Ohio), killing four people and wounding eleven others (for more detail, see N. K. Setunskiy, "SShA: inakomysliye pod pritselom" [United States: Taking Aim at Dissent], Moscow, 1981, pp 115-119).
13. The Anglo-Saxon legal tradition of the citizen's privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is regarded in the United States as the cornerstone of bourgeois constitutionalism in the sphere of justice, and the government therefore strives to preserve its constitutional inviolability. This, however, does not prevent rank-and-file law enforcement personnel--the police--from violating it on a broad scale in their daily practice of the arrest and detention of citizens. The privilege of hundreds or even thousands of Americans of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended without any official government declaration as a result of this kind of disregard for the law by the police.
14. V. A. Kovalev, "Burzhuaznaya yustitsiya: s kem i protiv kogo?" [Bourgeois Justice: On Whose Side Is It?], Moscow, 1981, pp 12-13.
15. In the decisions on *Hirabayashi v. United States*, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) and *Korematsu v. United States*, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Despite the constitutional tradition of the judicial review of administrative acts and actions, the decisions of military authorities in a state of emergency are not subject to judicial review.
16. "The Constitution of the United States of America," p 458. For example, at the time when the special Senate committee conducted its investigation in 1976, the President still had emergency powers stemming from unsuspended

nationwide emergency measures declared by F. Roosevelt in 1933 in connection with the bank crisis, H. Truman in 1950 in connection with the Chinese intervention in Korea and R. Nixon in 1970 (postal strike) and 1971 (monetary crisis). The committee reported the following conclusion: "The majority of Americans alive today have spent their entire life in a state of emergency. Since 1933 the guarantees and procedures envisaged in the constitution have been limited to one degree or another by executive branch directives whose legality rests on the continued existence of states of emergency declared by presidents" ("National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers," p 1). The paradoxical situation has motivated legislators to review all of the legal standards regulating the declaration and suspension of states of emergency, which are discussed below.

17. 50 U.S.C. §812, 813.
18. *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
19. Public Law 94-412, 94th Congress, 14 September 1976.
20. According to these documents, the functions of overseeing the implementation of the President's emergency powers are assigned to a federal state of emergency administrative council. The members of the council are the director of the Crisis Management Agency (responsible for the compilation of state of emergency programs), the director of the Office of Management and Budget and high-placed members of the administration who are appointed to this body by a special order of the President.
21. G. Caldwell, "American Government Today," N.Y., 1963, p 226.
22. The government can also order troops to perform strike-breaking functions. In 1970 President R. Nixon mobilized the National Guard for postal operations during the national strike by postal employees. President Reagan used servicemen to perform the duties of striking air traffic controllers. As a result, both strikes were stifled by the administration.
23. "The Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States 1980," Wash., 1981, pp 89-90.

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS (DECEMBER 1982-FEBRUARY 1983)

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[Text] December 1982

1 -- A plenary meeting of Soviet and U.S. delegations took place in Geneva, concluding the latest round of talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons.

2 -- The responses of Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, to the questions of a TASS correspondent, in which he denied President Reagan's statements about the USSR's alleged "obviously superior" military strength, were published.

3 -- A session of the Soviet-American Permanent Consultative Commission on the second revision of the USSR-U.S. ABM Treaty came to an end in Geneva. In a communique published at the end of the session, the sides reaffirmed their adherence to the goals and objectives of the treaty and the consultation procedure within the framework of the permanent consultative commission for the promotion of the goals and provisions of the treaty and the protocol to the treaty of 3 July 1974.

14 -- In a speech on American radio, U.S. President R. Reagan called for the deployment of the MX missile system.

16 -- Governor E. Brown of California sent Ronald Reagan a letter demanding that an agreement be negotiated with the USSR on a nuclear freeze, citing the results of the 2 November referendum on the nuclear freeze, during the course of which the majority of the state population supported this proposal.

18 -- Soviet-American consultations on nuclear nonproliferation were held in Washington. The Soviet side was represented by Deputy Chairman I. G. Morozov of the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy and Ambassador V. F. Petrovskiy, member of the collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the American side was represented by Ambassador-at-Large R. Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of Energy K. Davis and Assistant Secretaries of State J. Malone and G. Newell.

21 -- In a report entitled "The Sixty Years of the USSR," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov noted: "One of the main roads leading to the effective reduction of the danger of nuclear war is naturally the road of agreement by the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms." Yu. V. Andropov explained the USSR position on START and on nuclear weapons in Europe.

22 -- The CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet approved a message "To the Parliaments, Governments, Political Parties and People of the World," containing an appeal to stop the arms race and avert nuclear war.

24 -- Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, received U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman at his request. They discussed several aspects of Soviet-American relations, including questions connected with the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe.

25-27 -- A delegation from Farmers for Peace, an American antiwar organization, was in the USSR.

31 -- Yu. V. Andropov's replies to the questions of American political correspondent J. Kingsbury-Smith were published.

January 1983

2 -- PRAVDA published an editorial on "Two Approaches to START."

4 -- Secretary General Gus Hall of the Communist Party U.S.A. addressed a gathering of the progressive American public in New York and criticized the anti-Soviet policy of the American administration.

4-5 -- The political consultative committee of the Warsaw Pact states met in Prague for a conference. A political declaration was adopted, in which the top representatives of these states announced: "There is no more important objective for people at the present time than the preservation of peace and the cessation of the arms race." The declaration set forth a detailed program of action in this direction. It says that "the states represented at the conference attach great significance to the success of the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms" and underscores the exceptional "importance of the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe." The Warsaw Pact states also suggested to the NATO states that a treaty be negotiated on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations.

6 -- The U.S. Customs Service announced the arrest of American businessmen S. Carter and P. Sakva and Canadian businessman J. McCall, charging them with the attempted "secret" delivery of equipment for the Kama Motor Vehicle Plant in the USSR. The American authorities admitted, however, that they had no evidence.

8 -- After reviewing the results of the conference of the political consultative committee of the Warsaw Pact states, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers fully approved the activities of the Soviet delegation, headed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov.

9 -- Congressman P. Simon (Democrat, Illinois), who had just returned from the USSR, appealed for the normalization of Soviet-American relations.

12 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov met in the Kremlin with H.-J. Vogel, the SPD candidate for federal chancellor of the FRG, and directed his attention to the extremely dangerous effects the realization of the U.S. and NATO plans for the deployment of the new American medium range nuclear weapons in Western Europe could have on peace in Europe.

Speaking on radio, President Reagan announced the United States' willingness to conduct talks with the USSR "to promote the cause of peace." But he did not make a constructive response to the Soviet peace initiatives, repeating the hackneyed lies of American propaganda about Soviet foreign policy and accusing the Soviet Union of undermining Soviet-American relations.

13 -- Former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR T. Watson announced that the Reagan Administration is totally and completely responsible for the deterioration of U.S.-USSR relations.

16 -- The militaristic policy of the Reagan Administration was pointedly criticized at the annual convention of the California State Democratic Party Organization in Sacramento. Former U.S. Vice-President W. Mondale and Senator A. Cranston, who are competing for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984, said that they would make nuclear disarmament talks with the USSR their primary objective if elected.

19 -- A PRAVDA editorial exposed the American strategy of blocking agreements with the USSR at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe. "Agreement is possible only on the basis of equality and equivalent security," the article stressed.

26 -- When the President delivered his State of the Union Message to a joint session of Congress, he said that the United States must base its strategy on force--economic and military.

27 -- The Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe were resumed in Geneva. A plenary session was held.

February

1 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov's replies to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent were published. Noting that the "zero option" was still being discussed in the U.S. President's address "To the People of Europe," Yu. V. Andropov said: "It is this unrealistic U.S. stand that is blocking, and this is well known, progress in the Geneva talks."

The first plenary session of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe was held after a recess in Geneva.

2 -- Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms resumed with a meeting of the delegation heads in Geneva.

3, 8, 10, 15, 17 -- Plenary sessions of the Soviet and U.S. delegations were held at the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and START.

4 -- Vice-President G. Bush addressed the Disarmament Commission in Geneva. He took every opportunity to advertise President Reagan's "zero option" and misrepresented the Soviet stand on this matter.

At the request of the American side, the heads of the Soviet delegations at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and START met with the U.S. vice-president in Geneva.

7 -- In an NBC television program, Democratic Senator A. Cranston pointed out the urgent need for concrete U.S.-Soviet agreements to curb the nuclear arms race.

11 -- At a press conference in New York, Secretary General Gus Hall of the Central Committee of the Communist Party U.S.A. underscored the importance of the new Soviet peace initiatives and the proposals put forth by the Warsaw Pact states.

14-16 -- A bilateral meeting of the expert groups on disarmament of the United Nations Associations in the USSR and United States was held in Moscow.

17 -- At his latest press conference in Washington, President Reagan said that the United States still insists on the "zero option."

A bomb was set off at the entrance to the building housing the Aeroflot agency in Washington. The Soviet Embassy demanded that the State Department take immediate additional steps to safeguard the security of Soviet establishments in the United States.

18 -- A TASS statement on Washington's announced "Program of Democracy and Public Diplomacy" was published.

24 -- The replies of A. A. Gromyko to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent, in which he explained the Soviet position on problems in the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, were published.

Addressing the annual American Legion Convention, President Reagan demanded "concessions" from the USSR.

A plenary meeting of the Soviet and U.S. START delegations was held in Geneva.

25 -- A plenary meeting of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe was held in Geneva.

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